Only nuclear-powered submarines can meet our future needs

The submarine is arguably the ultimate weapon of choice of the weaker power, but we are making a $90bn mistake.

An artist’s impression of the of the Royal Australian Navy’s future submarine, to be known as the Attack-class.

Australia’s controversial Attack-class submarine program has been widely criticised. At $90bn in out-turned dollars, it is very expensive. With delivery scheduled between 2035 and 2050, the boats will be in service far too late. Australian industry content will be too low to maintain our sovereign submarine capability.

These criticisms are all valid and provide sufficient grounds to cancel the Attack program now.

As the Auditor-General has pointed out, at around $140m the cancellation cost would be modest at this stage, but it will grow significantly the longer we delay.

The fundamental problem with the Attack-class submarine, however, is that it will not be fit for purpose. It will be unable to deliver a sufficiently large or potent force to deter an adversary from taking military action against Australia. Its vulnerability to detection and counter-attack means it will lack both efficiency and effectiveness in its operations, while its survivability will be increasingly challenged.

Modern conventional submarines are effective where they can maximise their advantage of stealth. For example, the mission objectives of the Japanese Soryu can be achieved with patrols about two weeks long and the submarine remaining dived throughout to minimise the chances of detection.

Australia’s diesel-electric submarines operate in a very different geography. They undertake operations of up to 70 days, with half of that time spent getting to and from their patrol area. As a senior naval engineer once noted, “Australia has the only navy in the world which flogs its diesel-electric submarines thousands of miles, across oceans, and then sends them on patrol”. It is not unusual for a Collins-class submarine to travel four or five times further each year than most other nations’ conventional submarines.

With these long transits and a limited number of submarines in our fleet, it is impossible for Australia to deploy a conventional submarine force of adequate size. Despite the submarines’ heavy armament, Australia’s contribution in its theatre of operations amounts to little more than a token force.

Officers and sailors at work on Collins-class submarine, HMAS Sheean, while transiting Cockburn Sound in Western Australia.

Notwithstanding Australia’s achievement in deriving best practice availability from our Collins-class submarines, with just six boats in the force we can be sure of having only one submarine on patrol in their far distant area of operations and then only for half the time. Even with 12 Attack-class submarines, only one will be available on station all the time and then not until 2050. While under wartime conditions the number of deployable submarines could be increased, their vulnerability to detection and counter-attack would increase the probability of destruction.

In this context, other nations in the region, particularly China, are investing heavily in anti-submarine warfare capability. Acoustic sensors, magnetic anomaly detectors, radar, underwater drones and, in some areas around our region thousands of “fishing boats” and militia vessels are all being extensively deployed to detect submarines in the heavily contested waters to our north.

Conventional submarines like Australia’s Collins-class are more vulnerable to detection than nuclear-powered submarines because every few days they must come close to the surface and raise a snorkel to run their diesel generators and recharge their batteries. Once detected, conventional submarines are less able to escape destruction than nuclear-powered boats because their sustainable maximum speed is lower.

Collins-class submarine, HMAS Sheean in Cockburn Sound, Western Australia.

Because of its stealth and destructive capability, the submarine is arguably the ultimate weapon of choice of the weaker power. Yet if the RAN is to operate them at all, it needs a sufficient force of viable submarines that can provide a credible, cost-effective deterrent in Australia’s vast exclusive economic zone and beyond.

The deterrent effect of submarines, with their ability to seek and destroy an adversary’s submarines and warships close to their bases, is vital to Australia’s defence posture. But in the future, only nuclear-powered attack submarines in combination with developing autonomous under-water technologies can provide the capability Australia needs. The increase in the strategic threat and the continually developing anti-submarine capability in our region mean that for Australia conventional submarines have had their day.

Developing the capability to operate and sustain nuclear-powered attack submarines would constitute Australia’s greatest national endeavour in living memory. Rock solid bipartisan political support would be essential. The program should be driven by a dedicated expert group reporting to the prime minister. We would need to build expertise in nuclear engineering through new tertiary courses and recruitment from overseas. Australia’s existing nuclear regulator would develop appropriate safety protocols and regulations.

Despite our lack of a domestic nuclear industry, Australia does have the essential foundation on which to build this capability.

One vital need is to produce a much greater number of trained and experienced submariners, particularly engineering specialists. This challenge will be at least as great as acquiring the subs themselves. We will also need support from friendly navies to train nuclear-qualified submariners.

The first step in the journey must be to secure support from the US. This has been refused in the past. Two factors could help open this door now. First, is the substantial deterioration in the strategic outlook in the Indo Pacific, where the Americans are experiencing a deficit in submarine availability. Secondly, in working with Australian submarines both in high-intensity exercises and ongoing combined operations, the US Navy has developed a respect for the professionalism of the RAN.

There is next to no prospect of acquiring American nuclear submarines, which have never been exported. Australia’s choice is limited to the British, which would be subject to US agreement, and the French. Nevertheless, this is enough to establish a proper competitive process leading to a fixed price tender at least for the first batch of submarines.

With a crew of around 100 compared with 65, British nuclear submarines are larger than their French counterparts. They also carry more weapons and use highly enriched uranium fuel that enables higher speed and 30 years without refuelling. French submarines use low enriched uranium, which could provide advantages for Australia, but they require refuelling every 10 years or so.

While conceptually Australian industry could build a nuclear submarine using an imported reactor, a more efficient solution may be to import the after end of the submarines, containing the reactor, and complete the build locally. A major challenge would be to incorporate sufficient local content to sustain Australia’s sovereign submarine capability.

Nuclear-powered submarines would provide the ADF with a potent offensive capability, both in projecting force a long way from home and in countering incursions by an adversary’s forces into Australia’s EEZ.

But acquiring them would be a challenge. Other options exist, such as long-range bombers for force projection and more land-based aircraft and missiles to deny an adversary access to Australia’s maritime approaches. Yet because of their destructive power, for Australia the deterrent effect of nuclear-powered attack submarines may be unsurpassed.

Commodore Paul Greenfield (RAN retired) was a naval engineering officer who headed the secretariat to the McIntosh-Prescott review of the Collins-class and was a principal of the Coles reviews; Jon Stanford is principal of the think tank Submarines for Australia and was a senior official in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.