Risk of 'pariah status' over Vietnam

MALCOLM Fraser's cabinet was told in 1979 that the Vietnamese refugee crisis threatened a head-on collision between hostile public opinion in Australia and the nation's foreign-policy interests.

MALCOLM Fraser's cabinet was told in 1979 that the Vietnamese refugee crisis threatened a head-on collision between hostile public opinion in Australia and the nation's foreign-policy interests.

Foreign minister Andrew Peacock warned that were Australia to adopt tough policies such as turning back refugee boats, it would risk "international pariah status". But he acknowledged that traditional fears in Australia of the "yellow peril" over large numbers of Vietnamese refugees could create one of the most divisive issues in our history.

Go to our 1979 Cabinet papers special section.

The cabinet documents released today by the National Archives capture the sense of crisis surrounding the issue. Ministers were told that up to three million people could flee Indo-China and that up to 150,000 could arrive by boat in coming years. The number of people leaving Vietnam by boat was increasing dramatically and had reached 55,000 in May - far ahead of the rate at which they were being resettled as refugees.

Not only were Vietnamese fleeing a country in which the communist north had defeated South Vietnam, the US and Australia in 1975, but the new regime was actively pushing people out - often after demanding large sums of money. A large humanitarian tragedy was being played out, with cabinet told of estimates of between 50 per cent and 70 per cent of people on boats perishing at sea. Those fleeing were forced to leave at all times of the year, including during the monsoon, in river boats unsuitable for sea journeys and vulnerable to attack by pirates.

A Morgan Gallup poll in February found that 61 per cent of Australians wanted to limit the number of refugees and 28 per cent wanted to stop them altogether. Despite this, the Fraser government accepted a total of almost 250,000 Vietnamese as refugees and migrants and it did so after considering but rejecting tough policies such as turning boats back, offshore processing, a large detention centre on the mainland and temporary refugee visas - all options subsequently adopted by the Howard government and, in the case of detention centres, the Keating government.

But it did introduce legislation to combat people-smuggling, with penalties of up to 10 years' jail, a $100,000 fine and the confiscation of vessels. However, the legislation only applied for a year, which immigration minister Michael MacKellar said would "provide flexibility and help defuse public criticism". It also offered the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees $250,000 towards the cost of a holding centre in Indonesia, including for asylum-seekers arriving in Australia.

Helping take the pressure off the government was that the feared flood of boat people did not materialise, with 2029 arriving between 1975 and 1979. Most of the refugees were processed instead by Australian officials in camps in Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries before being flown to Australia. The Fraser government was party to a regional agreement brokered by the US under which China, the US, Canada and Australia all took substantial numbers and Vietnam agreed to stop pushing people out of the country. The Fraser government also obtained support from the Labor opposition for its policy of accepting Vietnamese refugees.

But Sydney University professor of public law Mary Crock, an immigration law specialist, said Mr Fraser also deserved credit. "His humanitarianism and leadership during this period has never been properly recognised," she said. "At the time, it took a lot of courage. Up until 1972, we had a White Australia policy for everybody except for a narrow band of close family members."

A 14-page memo from Mr Peacock in July confronted cabinet with the the problem. "The dramatic escalation in the Indo-Chinese refugee problem in recent months threatens to precipitate a regional crisis of major dimensions," it began. "Not only is the stability of the region at stake but if the refugee problem were to get out of control, it would impose very serious strains on the unity and character of Australian society."

He warned of the major threat of an immediate increase in boatpeople arriving in Australia. "This new situation has all the ingredients for one of the most controversial and divisive issues in Australia's history. A hostile public reaction, stimulated by traditional fears of the `yellow peril' and by concern about present high levels of unemployment, could not only jeopardise government attempts to resolve the refugee problem but could also cause a head-on collision between domestic public opinion and Australia's foreign policy interests. If that were to happen, Australian governments would face impossible choices in sustaining an effective foreign policy in the region."

With most of those leaving Vietnam ethnic Chinese, Mr Peacock was worried that it could put pressure on Chinese and other minorities in Southeast Asian countries and threaten their stability, with the potential to trigger other refugee flows in countries like Hong Kong and Taiwan.

"Combined with evidence of the `porousness' of Australia in terms of its inability to prevent an inflow of boatpeople, it is no exaggeration to say that the refugee question could well become dominant, both in domestic policies and in foreign policy during the remainder of the century," his memorandum said. "It should certainly not be seen as a `one-off' problem.

"As a large, underpopulated `white' country, Australia would be especially vulnerable to international criticism if we failed to respond in a humane manner to the arrival of boat refugees from Asia on Australian territory." The Vietnamese government was manipulating the situation as a device to eliminate the urban professional and business class, many of whom were Chinese, and thereby weaken opposition to its rule and reduce what it considered to be a security risk.

The Peacock paper said the emphasis of Australian policy had to shift to "staunching the flow at source. Unless Vietnam can be pressured into radically altering its policies, the exodus of refugees will assume crisis proportions."

It canvassed options such as offering to process refugees in Saigon and "buying off" Vietnam by offering substantial aid for reconstruction but rejected both as legitimising Vietnam's present policies and granting it too many concessions. A policy of deterring refugees by welcoming the approach of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia in turning boats away would not work unless Australia was prepared to take a similar approach. "From the foreign policy perspective, it would not be feasible for Australia to contemplate turning the boatpeople away from Australian shores," Mr Peacock said in the memorandum. "In view of our image as a developed, technologically advanced and still under-populated country, such steps would be courting international pariah status; our position in Third World eyes would be untenable; we would be vulnerable to criticism on humanitarian and racial grounds; and given that we have lectured ASEAN countries about their responsibilities as countries of first asylum, we would be open to charges of hypocrisy."

Cabinet supported a sustained international campaign to pressure Vietnam into stopping or reducing the flow of refugees, including attacking its policies and cutting off aid. But the government continued a relatively generous policy, taking 20,000 refugees from Vietnam and other countries in 1978-79. This compares with the 12,000-13,000 Australia has taken in recent years, increased by the Rudd government to 13,750 for this financial year.

Mr MacKellar took a tougher line than Mr Peacock, canvassing options in a cabinet submission not taken up but foreshadowed later action by the Howard government. One was sending boatpeople to an overseas island for processing, on the basis of "their guaranteed resettlement".

Another was establishing a large detention centre in Darwin "without a future obligation by Australia to accept them for permanent residence or to consider their claims for refugee status".