Plea for dialogue on university security threats

The AFP says it has conducted criminal investigations where academics have been the targets of foreign intelligence services.

Universities want a ‘more open dialogue’ with federal agencies about foreign interference threats in the sector.

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Universities want a “more open dialogue” with federal agencies about foreign interference threats in the sector, and better protections for the staff tasked with internally managing these risks to ensure they aren’t implicated in the criminal offences they’re trying to counter.

In submissions to an independent review of dozens of Commonwealth espionage, foreign interference, sabotage and trade secret offences, unis also claimed that too many layers of bureaucracy were “diverting attention away” from genuine national security vulnerabilities.

It comes as the Australian Federal Police confirmed that while it had never charged an academic with espionage or foreign interference offences, it had conducted criminal investigations where academics had been the targets of foreign countries or intelligence services.

The sector’s calls follow multiple warnings from ASIO that spies may target cutting-edge research and technologies.

Universities mainly manage foreign interference risks through the University Foreign Interference Taskforce (UFIT), and guidelines that the Taskforce developed with Government in 2021, which includes training for staff and transparent reporting mechanisms.

In its submission, the Queensland University of Technology noted the UFIT guidelines required ongoing communication with Commonwealth agencies to maintain any “currency”.

QUT recommended “not only more open dialogue and discussion from Federal agencies on these issues with the sector, but also – critically – the development, improvement and entrenchment of more effective mechanisms for cross-portfolio awareness and communication between Commonwealth agencies with an interest in this space.”

It said there was, in its experience, a “lack of co-ordination between government agencies”, which could cause a double-up in regulation, and increased “real underlying risk by diverting attention and effort away from the identification, assessment and control of genuine national security vulnerability towards the management of multiple bureaucratic processes”.

QUT has proposed a legislated “inter-agency collaboration mechanism” to ensure all ­concerns are addressed “coherently”.

Nonetheless, the university said it did not believe its academics were at significant risk of inadvertently contravening any laws. The guidelines developed by UFIT also include having responsible individuals within the university manage foreign interference risks.

In its submission, Macquarie University said officers at Australian universities were routinely required to review research engagements to determine any risk of foreign interference or intellectual property theft, but were left liable.

“Macquarie University recommends that a review of the construction of these offences include consideration of the liabilities ... created for non-government personnel that manage counter foreign interference programs within non-government institutions.”

It recommended a notification process like those used for government sanctions to identify specific individuals working in this space.

The University questioned whether reckless foreign interference offences could apply to the individuals managing counter foreign interference programs within non-government institutions, and whether there needed to be “explicit protections” for those individuals.