Why Xi’s parade hides his military fragility

Australia doesn’t have to “tremble and obey”: we can lift our own defence effort, work with allies and deter China.
What’s on display in Tiananmen Square is really a collection of Xi Jinping’s strategic insecurities, an intelligence collection bonanza and the opportunity to shape a military response.
While the Beijing military parade will undoubtedly look impressive, a much harder question to answer is whether the People’s Liberation Army can use its new equipment to best effect, and whether the equipment will operate as suggested.
Russia’s new military technology looked impressive in Red Square but collapsed within days in the second invasion of Ukraine. In the Donbas, Russia has gone back to fighting with 1950s and ‘60s vintage tanks and artillery.
The most important audience for this parade is the Chinese public. The PLA is the army of the CCP, not the Chinese state. Following Chairman Mao’s dictum that power flows from the barrel of a gun, Xi is saying the Communist Party is firmly in control, backed by the PLA.
Beijing uses these parades to show its growing military power to the world.
That’s why there will be a large audience of international dignitaries attending, mostly China’s authoritarian allies and some compliant Western supporters.
Among the equipment expected to be on show are hypersonic anti-ship missiles, a weapon known as the YJ-21 “aircraft carrier killer” and number of new and fielded anti-ship missiles designed to keep the US aircraft carrier battle groups far away from the Chinese mainland.
These weapons are the primary reason why the Australian Defence Force would struggle to safely operate surface ships in combat in the South China Sea and why we need to move to uncrewed drone systems urgently.
On display also will be mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles including the DF-31AG and DF-41 mobile ICBMs and a submarine-launched missile, the JL-3.
Australia falls within the range of Chinese ICBMs: this degree of vulnerability to long-range missile attack is a first in our strategic history and something for which the ADF is completely unprepared.
The parade will highlight the FH-97 stealth combat drone, which is said to be battle-ready, and additional unmanned systems including underwater drones, autonomous battle tanks and drone swarms.
Immaculately drilled PLA troops will march across Tiananmen Square in precise 75cm steps. This may look spectacular but military analysts understand the difference between troops drilled for parade versus real military capabilities.
The reality is that the PLA lacks modern combat experience. Defence calls PLA behaviour in the South China Sea “unprofessional”. Crazy brave risk-taking is not a smart strategy for any military outfit.
Publicly available PLA journals lament the lack of initiative displayed by Chinese non-commissioned officers and other ranks.
Xi is reportedly dissatisfied with the ability of the military to modernise and eliminate corruption.
Chinese ships and submarines still put to sea with a political commissar. At the end of a shift on a Chinese submarine, the crew sits down for an hour’s instruction in Xi thought before they can sleep.
American analysts write about PLA doctrine shaped around “control and command” where the headquarters micromanage deployed units.
That contrasts with Western military forces where command and control doctrines hand significant decision-making power to deployed forces.
As a Defence official, I found PLA officers were very interested to ask their Australian counterparts about how we trained sergeants and non-commissioned officers. The answer was that we gave our people the ability to make their own tactical and operational decisions. That trust remains absent in the modern PLA.
A few years ago, I attended a Shangri-la security dialogue in Singapore and saw a three-star Chinese PLA general shock the audience by saying how much he was looking forward to testing the military capabilities of his force in combat.
The biggest danger for the PLA is overconfidence coming from the Communist Party’s propaganda. More than anything, it is that overconfidence we will see on parade in Beijing today.
But don’t be complacent: a fragile if overconfident PLA is highly dangerous.
Xi wants you to think that his military is unstoppable. The truth is he’s not certain of that, as his regular purges of top generals shows.
This doubt means Xi can be deterred from military adventurism – but only if we strengthen our own defences and resist the defeatism Beijing wants us to absorb.
Xi’s parade is yet another message to the Albanese government that we need to urgently increase defence spending to re-equip the ADF as fast as possible.
Let’s not forget that working with allies, principally the US, is Australia’s “superpower”.
Albanese’s failure to shape the US alliance to our national advantage is a mistake, but one that’s still fixable.
In Defence, our focus should be on uncrewed systems, missiles and long-range strike capabilities.
Well into its fourth year, the Albanese government issues defence media releases like its own swarm of drones.
But where are the weapons?
Peter Jennings is a director of Strategic Analysis Australia and an adjunct fellow at the Institute of Public Affairs. He is a former executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and was previously deputy secretary for strategy in the Defence Department.
The most dangerous weapon on show in Beijing on Wednesday is not a missile, drone or tank but the aggressive nationalism that’s being stoked by the Chinese Communist Party.