We’ve been lucky so far, but time to focus on Darwin

Defending a large country with a small population has always been Australia’s biggest strategic challenge. That we have successfully done so has been due to luck, great and powerful friends, our unique continental-island geography and the military technological edge we have enjoyed historically in our near region.

But we may not remain a lucky country for much longer if US military power and our geographical and technological advantages continue to erode. We need to be smarter and more strategic in how to defend ourselves, starting with a better appreciation of the critical importance of northern Australia to defence and national security.

This is the essential conclusion of a path-breaking report on the future security of Australia’s north by the influential Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Its author, John Coyne, mounts a compelling case for an overhaul of our disjointed, siloed and piecemeal approach to defending the north.

Australia has seriously focused on northern defence only twice since Federation. The first was just before the imperial Japanese air force attacked Darwin in February 1942. But our preparations were too little and too late, despite adequate intelligence warning. The resulting destruction significantly reduced our capacity to defend the continent and resupply allies in Indonesia and The Philippines. The second was Paul Dibb’s landmark 1986 report, which led to an overdue bulking-up of defence capability in northern Australia.

Thereafter, momentum was lost. In the three decades since the Dibb report, defence and national security investment in the north has rarely matched government rhetoric. Investment has waxed and waned, the number of defence personnel has fallen and the supposedly Darwin-based 1st Brigade has been hollowed out with its core infantry and armour units redeployed 3000km south to Adelaide.

And as Coyne points out, there has been “no substantial public policy dialogue on the role of northern Australia in defence strategy and national security policy” for 30 years.

Equally concerning is the myth that northern Australia is an inhospitable place for defence force personnel to live and train. Darwin today cannot be described as a hardship posting, with a climate and amenities that compare favourably with most regional centres of its size. If the ADF needs to fight and operate in our mostly tropical region then tropical Australia is where they need to train all year round, especially in the wet and not as a drive-in, drive-out force.

A rapidly deteriorating regional security environment means we should act soon. In the next crisis we won’t have the luxury of 10 years’ warning. Serious threats are emerging with disconcerting speed. The problem is that we are underdone on defence infrastructure and manufacturing in the north and haven’t done nearly enough to think through, and invest in, the sustainment of forces deployed from the north.

Darwin is the obvious focal point for a reconceptualised northern Australia. Coyne argues persuasively that what is required is a single, scalable defence and national security ecosystem to include all parts of the national security community from Defence to Home Affairs and the intelligence agencies. This is a long way from today’s thinking, which regards northern Australia as primarily a place for defence training, rotations, limited maintenance and the forward deployment of small numbers of land, air, naval and border patrol assets.

In Coyne’s more expansive vision, the whole of the north would become a forward operating base to deliver “integrated support to current and future ADF and national security operations”. A core problem for northern jurisdictions has been the attraction and retention of skilled personnel.

But the successful completion of large and technically demanding projects, such as the $US45 billion ($66.4bn) Ichthys LNG Proj­ect in Darwin, show that highly skilled workforces can be attracted north with the right approach.

While the north would remain vital for continental defence, Coyne envisages strengthening the enabling architecture for ADF and alliance operations in the Indo-Pacific giving substance to the declaratory refrain of defence with the region, rather than from the region. The great virtue of a forward-operating northern base is its promise of greater capability across an integrated network of infrastructure that can quickly respond to any issue. This can only be achieved by enlarging the northern Australia industrial and logistics base.

It will also require a new attitude. The north must be central, not peripheral, to defence and national security. This means investing in northern infrastructure, manufacturing, communications and training systems that will augment intelligence collection, maritime surveillance, border protect­ion, search-and-rescue, ship maintenance and the developm­ent of a critical minerals industry.

At a national level our fuel reserves and refining capacity are too thin. In a crisis, we can’t rely on others to provide the fuel we need for ADF operations and national emergencies. But a land-based or offshore floating refinery in the north resolves this. Queensland- and Northern Territory-based companies are building satellite launch vehicles and infrastructure. When operational they will give Australia a sovereign launch facility and our own eyes in space for the first time. These new capabilities should be prioritised and integrated into our national security and development strategies.

Coyne is on the mark arguing “money can’t just come from the defence budget. It must be done on a national cost-sharing basis and include the private sector”.

Turning Coyne’s vision into real action will require political leadership and close co-operation between the Northern Territory, Queensland, Western Australia and Canberra. Jurisdictional infighting is a recipe for failure.

Given their home states and portfolio responsibilities, this is an opportunity for Defence Minister Linda Reynolds, Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton, and Resources and Northern Australia Minister Matt Canavan to step up and become national champions for an integrated approach to the north.

Alan Dupont is chief executive officer of geopolitical risk consultancy The Cognoscenti Group, a nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute and a member of the Northern Territory’s Strategic Defence Advisory Board.