Gillard must clearly make case for Afghan war

An illustration by Peter Nicholson

LABOR, now in alliance with the Greens, can no longer continue to duck responsibility.

THE debate in parliament on Afghanistan will put Julia Gillard under intense pressure because she will need a justification for this war that transcends the usual cliches concealing strategic reality.

Labor's complacency on Afghanistan has been sustained by the previous low casualties and bipartisanship with the Coalition. It originated in the "good war-bad war" paradigm where Labor exploited its support for the Afghan war to offset its opposition to the Iraq war in order to uphold its national security credentials.

The banality of official justification for Australia's role in Afghanistan reflects the psychology of a junior alliance partner reluctant to accept responsibility for the war's progress and purpose.

Labor needs to beware the changing politics around Afghanistan, with new elements emerging: higher Australian casualties and operational complaints from the troops fanned by alarm, with three soldiers facing charges including that of manslaughter.

The Greens, the only party seeking to terminate Australia's commitment, will highlight the increase in deaths while the Coalition will exploit evidence of concern within the armed forces to hammer its own critique.

This will sharpen the political focus even more on the Chief of the Defence Force, Angus Houston, whom Labor invokes to justify the nature and scale of Australia's commitment against critics.

Gillard was sensible to visit Afghanistan as soon as possible after being confirmed as Prime Minister post-election.

Her message is predictable and continues Kevin Rudd's policy: Australia is pledged to work with the US and NATO in Afghanistan. Our mission in Oruzgan province is limited.

It is neither to save the nation nor guarantee its democracy but, rather, to train the 4th brigade of the Afghan National Army. Gillard's conclusion is also predictable: "Our troops are making progress". She repeats Houston's advice that this will take "between two to four years". Decoded, this provides flexibility for our exit.

Rejecting Coalition criticism, Gillard tied Houston to Labor's fate: "The fact that we have deployed the right number of people with the right equipment to acquit the mission was confirmed to me by the Chief of the Defence Force." It was, Gillard said, affirmed by commanders on the ground. She mocked the Coalition's call for tanks saying "you may as well send them a submarine". As for helicopters, they were provided by the Dutch and Americans. So Houston is Gillard's frontline political defence as the heat intensifies.

It is not good enough. It is time for Labor to accept full political responsibility for the Afghanistan commitment, with the Prime Minister making a comprehensive strategic statement to the house.

Defence analyst and former official Hugh White says: "This objective of training the Afghan forces doesn't work. It presupposes you can build a strong armed forces when they are serving a weak government. The weakness of the Karzai government is the main problem for the coalition forces. I am deeply sceptical that we can really achieve much in Afghanistan because to have real impact you need a much bigger force for a far longer period. I do not believe the Australian government has offered an assessment of the Afghanistan commitment on its merits."

This penetrates to President Barack Obama's dilemma. His late 2009 decision to commit an extra 30,000 troops was contradicted by his signal that US withdrawals from Afghanistan could begin next year.

It reveals a psychological, financial and strategic equivocation at the heart of Western policy.

The US commander at the time, Stanley McChrystal, had warned that without a policy change the war "will likely result in failure". Yet Obama held the generals in check.

In Bob Woodward's recent book, Obama's Wars, he reveals the tensions between the President and his military commanders, with Obama saying: "I'm not doing 10 years. I'm not doing long-term nation building. I am not spending a trillion dollars."

No, he can't. This is the true Obama position. Maybe he is a weak President but maybe he is just a realist. Obama knows the US public cannot tolerate stalemate in Afghanistan; he knows that with US government debt heading towards 90 per cent of gross domestic product by 2020, he cannot spend a trillion dollars in Afghanistan; he knows that with American spirits fragile and its economy precarious, his priority must lie on the home front. And he would know the Soviet story: they killed one million Afghans and lost the war.

Obama's strategy is guided by a new benchmark: a grasp of the limits to US military power and a recognition that America must become a more prudent nation.

The drama of Obama's decision-making crisis over Afghanistan was largely ignored in Australia, proof of complacency in an ally insufficiently diligent about the consequences of the war and its outcome.

The upcoming debate on Afghanistan should be vigorous. In June, former defence minister John Faulkner said Australia's aims were to deny sanctuary to terrorists, to help stabilise the country and to uphold our alliance with the US. Gillard must now provide a persuasive case for these objectives and she must offer a full assessment of the progress of the US-led war. If she falls back on the old cliches, Labor will be courting trouble.

Of course, the politics are obvious: Australia went into Afghanistan with the US and it will leave Afghanistan with the US. This is how responsible allies behave.

But that cannot exempt Gillard from the responsibility Labor has ducked: a proper strategic assessment of the war. If Labor refuses this task there is only one explanation, that the truth is so bad it cannot be told.

This is not an argument for withdrawal. Mature governments do not cut and run ahead of their senior allies. From the start, Australia's commitment was mandated by the UN and the invoking of the ANZUS Treaty.

It operates as part of a 40-nation-plus coalition and its decisions will be made as part of that coalition and within a US alliance framework.

Gillard's dilemma is significant yet underestimated. It can be stated precisely: she will be caught, on the one hand, between an Afghanistan strategy unlikely to work and, on the other hand, the intolerable prospect of being seen to succumb to the Greens' demand for retreat. She will not retreat yet she will need substantive reasons to stay the course.

For this first time this debate should bring focus to the Greens' foreign and security policy. It is a world view, documented point by point, stunning in its isolationist utopian pacifist philosophy, unsuitable for the responsibility of nationhood. Long ignored, it needs to see sunlight.