Double dissolution a Coalition horror

AN early election is not Kevin Rudd's objective, yet his gains from a double dissolution are potentially immense and this is the key to future politics. A double dissolution gets Rudd to the polls before the worst of the downturn, possibly before the jobless rate reaches 8 per cent, maximises his House of Representatives vote, destroys the Coalition's gross over-representation in the Senate and constitutes the new upper house at once rather than on July1, 2011.

Taken together, such advantages pose a mortal threat to the Coalition parties. The paradox, of course, is that only the Coalition creates the conditions for a double dissolution. The test, therefore, for Liberal leader Malcolm Turnbull is to persuade his party to avoid a double dissolution election and ensure a full term parliament.

The Coalition has 37 senators, just one short of half the chamber, yet in the nation at large the Coalition vote is weak. The beauty of a double dissolution for Rudd is that it translates immediately the nation's pro-Labor mood into the entire parliament, including the entire Senate. It completes the transition of power from Rudd's 2007 election victory, when only half the Senate went to the polls.

A double dissolution is likely to cut the Coalition's numbers from 37 to 34 senators or even fewer. It is likely to increase Labor's Senate numbers from 32 to 34.

The deeper point, however, is that a double dissolution based on present polls would probably establish a Left-Centre Senate majority lasting for some years, with vast policy consequences, a horror scenario for the Coalition.

The biggest winners from a double dissolution may be the Greens. Now sitting with five senators, a double dissolution would surely give the Greens a senator in each state (with a quota of only 7.7 per cent being required) and probably two in Tasmania, making a total of seven.

The Greens would probably command the Senate balance of power, further entrenching them as the third party, a highly equivocal outcome for Labor.

Senate results are difficult to predict given a double dissolution's low quota when all 76 senators are elected, thereby creating scope for minor parties and independents to win the final couple of places for each state.

But election analyst Malcolm Mackerras says the core conclusion is obvious.

"Kevin Rudd has a huge interest in a double dissolution as far as the Senate result goes," Mackerras says.

"Labor and the Greens would be the winners. It would almost certainly deliver control of the Senate to the parties of the Left."

If Rudd calls an early election he needs a legitimising story. Only a double dissolution on a substantive issue offers this. Otherwise Rudd would be cast as a cut-and-run Prime Minister, calling an early poll the nation does not need merely to save his own neck.

Rudd understands this perfectly. His message in his The 7.30 Report interview with Kerry O'Brien last week was unmistakable: Rudd will not initiate an early election. Indeed, he said: "I want to ensure that we are serving our full term."

Rudd declared himself a John Howard conservative on elections. In Howard's 11 years as PM the media ran hundreds of stories across his four terms saying Howard was going early. Every single story was wrong. Howard called four elections and each was a full-term poll.

For Rudd, therefore, early election politics are solely double dissolution politics. That means the real decision lies with Turnbull. Once again, Rudd made this clear on The 7.30 Report, saying he was seized by the "absolute importance" of getting his program through the Senate. This penetrates to Rudd's real aim by raising the double dissolution spectre: to secure his own agenda.

The truth is that no prime minister, from Gough Whitlam to Howard, wanted to call an early double dissolution election. It is only a resort under pressure.

Indeed, Howard was conspicuous for having the most double dissolutions bills yet declining to call a double dissolution.

In recent weeks Rudd has leveraged his double dissolution option for specific goals: he has re-introduced his 2008 alcopops tax bill, warned the Coalition against rejection of his 2009 budget saving measures and redesigned his carbon pollution reduction scheme with a start date in the next parliament.

When unveiling his new carbon scheme, Rudd said: "It's time to get off the fence, Mr Turnbull, and it's time to act in the national interest and to secure this legislation."

The initial response from Turnbull and Coalition spokesman Andrew Robb was negative. But there is no prize for guessing Turnbull's real preference: he wants to deny giving Rudd an early double dissolution poll on climate change, a 2007 replay with the Coalition depicted as an out-of-touch Dad's Army bunch of climate-change sceptics in a campaign that distracts attention from the economy, the only issue on which Turnbull could possibly win.

Turnbull's task is to fight the election on his issues, not Rudd's. With the Government in record deficit, Turnbull is now giving passage to the alcopops tax and most of the budget savings.

This is a change of tactics. And it is essential: Turnbull needs to avoid making himself the issue by rejecting savings when his own policy requires more savings.

Opinion within the Coalition is split over Rudd's carbon measures. There are signs of a revolt in rural and regional Australia and a high expectation that Turnbull will oppose, amend or block the detested scheme. On the other hand, the pro-environment "mainstream" under-50s vote will not reward Turnbull for any rejection; nor will the business lobbies that want this scheme passed, because they want investment certainty and know they will never get a softer start than what Rudd now offers.

For the Liberal Party, dislike of Rudd's scheme is not a good enough reason to deny its Senate passage.

Such bravado coming so soon after the 2007 election would be a political folly bound to assist Labor and the Greens. The risk for the Liberal Party is that a hardline stand against emissions trading will consolidate a Labor-Green majority position in the country, with the Coalition entrenched as a minority.

The Liberals should aim to divide Labor and the Greens; this is best achieved by supporting the carbon measures.

The irony of Rudd's position is that he does not prefer a double dissolution. But if presented with the option, it has enough advantages for Rudd to pull the trigger.

In this sense it remains a real rather than a phony threat.