Does Andrews’ ‘ring of steel’ allow a bit of flex just where he feels the political pinch?

Daniel Andrews may be perplexed about why the epidemic in Victoria is spreading at three times the rate of NSW, but the answers look pretty simple.

The outbreak in NSW started in the eastern suburbs and had a slow initial burn due to high compliance, low average household numbers, a high average income and significant financial security.

When it spread to the west and southwest and then real­ly took off, the NSW government introduced a combination of very hard (and progressively harder) containment restrictions in the local government areas where the virus was rapidly spreading; and harsh but less punitive restrictions across the rest of Greater Sydney. This strategy, while not perfect, has shown real dividends in controlling the outbreak; exact­ly how great those dividends were will not be clear for several more months.

In Melbourne, however, the virus kicked off in the northern and western suburbs, where a combination of somewhat lower compliance, high average household numbers and low relative incomes (many residents with multiple jobs and having to travel for them) meant the virus spread very rapidly.

The growth of the virus has continued to be focused in a small number of LGAs in the north and west but, despite the escalation of case numbers, the Victorian government has refused to tighten restrictions in these areas. Dan’s proverbial “ring of steel” was often mentioned (mostly in relation to how it was needed in NSW) but was not introduced where it was needed most: within the most infected parts of Melbourne. It appears certain that case numbers in Melbourne will exceed those of Sydney within the next week.

The Melbourne LGAs most affected by Covid are strong Labor electorates; this virus does not respect politics, only appropriate health measures.

Geoff O’Brien, Eltham, Vic

It is clear AUKUS and the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines (“PM slams Labor division on subs”, 24/9) is intended to shore up Australia’s deterrent capability, but an in-service date of late 2030 and reliance on failing Collins-class submarines increase Australia’s vulnerability.

Is there an opportunity to deploy a minimum of three subs at an earlier date by acquiring the proven technological assets of the British Astute and American Virginia-class submarines as is – not reinventing the wheel – and by basing construction of the submarines in Britain, the US and Australia? Australian security must take precedence over employment by using and transferring the many skills of Australia’s British and American partners.

As to the French contract, it matters not if Australia is blameless; the damage is done. But measures are needed to minimise the potential fallout, lest AUKUS diminish the potency of NATO, an alliance critical to Australia’s security.

Robert Boone, Bomaderry, NSW

ALP dignitaries ask how the nuclear submarine project can be delivered without a domestic nuclear capability. It can’t be, and why should it?

It was Labor policy that forced the government to call the tenders for diesel-powered submarines, and now that we have been offered the wonderful opportunity to access the world’s most advanced submarine technology the ALP calls it into question for the same reason. Do military requirements mean less to them than their ideology?

Don Higson, Paddington, NSW

I cannot see why New Zealand remains in ANZUS. It is unable to contribute meaningfully to the defence of the Indo-Pacific region and any contribution it does make would be confined to army personnel. New Zealand’s ban on visits by nuclear-powered ships renders it virtually useless in any naval conflict.

The New Zealand government should do the right thing and withdraw from the ANZUS alliance.

Gavan Duffy, Edens Landing, Qld

Graham Richardson’s false claim that Gough Whitlam ended Australia’s Vietnam War when Labor was elected in December 1972 (“Demonstrations of our vigorous democracy in action”, 24/9) must be refuted.

In fact, it was the McMahon government that had ordered Australian forces out of Vietnam 16 months earlier in August 1971. Then followed seven months of what was effectively a logistic withdrawal, completed at the end of February 1972.

I flew out on the last plane to leave on February 29. The next day the small combat element that had protected the withdrawal sailed from Vung Tau on HMAS Sydney. All that Whitlam brought out, nine months later, was the last handful of the Australian Army training team that had almost completed its withdrawal anyway. It seems that was enough to establish the myth.

Graeme Loughton, Brigadier (retd), Indooroopilly, Qld