Foreign agents will be targeting nuclear sub secrets for decades
It is early days in the decades-long project, but it is patently clear the government will need to invest enormously in the years ahead to safeguard the nuclear technology that will be shared with our AUKUS partners, the US and UK.
The one-in-10 rejection figure is not yet ringing alarm bells among AUKUS insiders, given that reasons for rejection range from the relatively benign – like inappropriate social media use or doubts about their stated commitment to the AUKUS project - to the concerning, where, for example, a Chinese Australian applicant has links to government authorities in China.
But the blunt truth is that the AUKUS nuclear submarine project has placed a generational target on Australia’s back for foreign spy agencies. The quicker Australia prepares for this major intelligence war, the better.
China, Russia and Iran will be leading the charge to infiltrate and steal the secret nuclear technology which will be shared within the three-nation pact as Australia buys, maintains and ultimately builds its own nuclear submarines.
Other nations, such as India, Indonesia and other regional neighbours will also have an interest in obtaining information on sensitive submarine technologies for commercial as well as for security reasons.
ASIO chief Mike Burgess says foreign spy services have already shown an “unhealthy interest” in the AUKUS enterprise.
“You would be genuinely shocked by the number and names of countries trying to steal our secrets,” Mr Burgess said in July when speaking of the broader espionage threat.
“The obvious candidates are very active – I’ve previously named China, Russia and Iran – but many other countries are also targeting anyone and anything that could give them a strategic or tactical advantage, including sensitive but unclassified information,” Mr Burgess said.
The Australian Federal Police has established an AUKUS command that works with the Department of Defence and Australian Submarine Agency to shield nuclear submarine secrets and protect key personnel, technology and submariners. But AUKUS will be a major test of Australia’s security agencies given the country does not have a civil nuclear industry and is relatively inexperienced in the safeguarding of nuclear technology.
The Americans and the British will be closely watching Australia’s security regime with all aspects of the AUKUS enterprise, given that any lapse in security here would undermine their own nuclear security.
You can be sure that if they spot any loopholes or weaknesses in Australia’s AUKUS protection regime, they will be quick to tell Canberra.
When it comes to vetting applicants for sensitive jobs within AUKUS, the dilemma for Australian security authorities is that it must strike a careful balance to ensure security without unnecessarily locking out highly skilled workers.
It is a reality that Australian citizens of Chinese, Indian and other foreign backgrounds are more highly represented in the high tech STEM disciplines, which are in high demand for the AUKUS project. These groups are likely to apply for AUKUS jobs in disproportionately high numbers. AUKUS needs their skills and should, of course, employ them whenever possible. Yet their ethnicity requires Australian authorities to carefully vet what ongoing connections they may have in their country of origin. This takes time, money and requires important judgments by ASIO and other agencies.
It is a big challenge but it’s one the government should be able to achieve. After all, as far as we know, no foreign nation has ever managed to compromise Pine Gap or other Australia-US joint facilities. But AUKUS is a massive beast and it will be the target of the most capable and dangerous spies for decades. There is no room for complacency.
The workplace AI battle hasn’t even started yet
The daunting task of ensuring foreign powers do not infiltrate the AUKUS nuclear submarine project has been highlighted by the one-in-ten rejection rate for applicants for sensitive roles in the enterprise.