Europe’s China woes prompt security game-changer

European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. Picture: AFP

Missed by many amid Russia’s war on Ukraine, Australia’s federal election and China’s inroads into the Pacific was the EU’s Strategic Compass, launched in March after almost two years in the making. As Defence Minister Richard Marles announces a visit to France, we should understand its importance and encourage its implementation.

Much happened in these two years including Covid-19, a deterioration in EU-China relations and the outbreak of a war on Europe’s eastern flank. In this context, the Strategic Compass is a potential game changer or, in the words of Josep Borrell, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a “turning point”. It is the first time the 27 EU countries have come together to focus on defence and security rather than just trade.

France considers it a significant achievement of its role as chair of the EU Council. The EU Council describes the compass as “an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy by 2030” launched within a “more hostile security environment”. It is aimed not only at empowering the bloc’s strategic autonomy but also at fostering its co-operation with security partners around the world. It coincides with NATO’s launch of its 2022 Strategic Concept, which refers in an unprecedented way to China as a challenge.

This shift in Europe comes as Australia resets its relationships with France following the submarine project cancellation and with the EU after years of misalignment on climate policy. Australia’s security and regional stability require both resets to happen so the government should embrace the compass and encourage the EU’s strategic shift, notwithstanding its focus on Russia.

Emmanuel Macron welcomes Anthony Albanese to the presidential Elysee Palace in Paris. Picture: Supplied by the PMO

For years the EU has approached its relationship with China in the hope that an engagement strategy more silent on malicious activity would result in EU prosperity and increased liberalisation in China. The result has been some economic prosperity but greater opportunity for attempted coercion by Beijing.

While the EU’s 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy referred to China as a systemic rival, it also called it a partner. This inconsistency and ambiguity were always a short-term tactic. We need the Strategic Compass to be the long-term security strategy.

A lasting problem is some EU members view the US with cynicism. The emphasis of the compass on EU security autonomy is in part born out of an aim to quell limited but loud discontent about the union being too reliant on the US. Ensuring the US is held accountable for its actions is vital but EU members’ hesitancy to hold Beijing to the same standards has hurt Australia.

EU countries collectively have more influence and trust than they realise in Southeast Asian and Pacific nations. Australia should work with the EU to turn this position of trust into a position of positive influence. The Strategic Compass needs to be a part of this, with Australia able to emphasise the strategy’s focus on strengthening security partnerships. This is vital for foreign and defence policy, to ensure EU members know groups such as AUKUS and the Quad do not rule out broader security partnerships.

Chinese nuclear-powered missile and attack submarines parade for Chairman Xi Jinping. Picture: PLAN

The EU experience with China should be a key lesson for our region, which would benefit from EU members being upfront about the challenges they have faced. The Chinese government has tried to use its economic heft to bully and coerce individual EU members and the EU as a whole. We have seen the example of Lithuania. By itself, the Baltic country would not have stood a chance over its stance on Taiwan, but the EU showed its collective strength and how to counter coercion from a major power. The response included EU financial assistance to Lithuanian companies affected by Beijing’s trade measures, an EU case against China at the World Trade Organisation and public support making it clear the bloc would not allow one of its smallest members to be unfairly targeted.

The response required the willingness of EU members to forgo short-term economic gain and impose costs – reputational and economic – on Beijing. In the past this often has proven to be an insurmountable obstacle for collective action. This stymied China’s attempt to embed itself in Europe through the 17+1 trade grouping and other initiatives – thinking it could rely on those in Europe who thought the easiest way out of economic crisis was Beijing’s largesse. The 17+1, now effectively 14+1 after Lithuania and more recently Estonia and Latvia left, is on the verge of collapsing because of China’s malicious activities, in particular economic coercion and failure to deliver promised results.

While the EU-China relationship shouldn’t have become as entangled as it did, the Lithuania case was the catalyst for refocusing on individual and regional sovereignty. The EU has finally found some momentum to look after its unity and integrity.

Why does this matter to Australia? Apart from the principle of supporting all partners subject to coercion, the similarities with the Pacific are clear – China is picking off those small nations keen on quick financial support, those it sees as weak links.

Hoping, or expecting, a Lithuania-style own goal from Beijing in the Pacific is not a strategy. The federal government now has a chance to become the leading partner for the EU in the region, especially with its renewed focus on climate policy that matches the Pacific’s top priority, as well as the EU’s. Combine that with Australia’s effort to reset with France and expect to see a Pacific program as part of reinvigorated relations.

Active Australia-EU collaboration, along with partners such as the US and Japan, can ensure we are not only relying on China’s own goals but scoring plenty of our own.

Justin Bassi is executive director and Daria Impiombato is an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.