The devastating loss by Ben Roberts-Smith in his defamation case will deliver a profound blow to the morale of the army and the Australian Defence Force generally.
It was always a difficult case to understand. At some level, Roberts-Smith must believe himself innocent, or either remember or construe his actions differently from the way the court has. On the other hand, the evidence against him was strong.
Still, we should remember this was not a criminal case and Roberts-Smith has not been charged with any crime and he has not been found guilty of anything to a criminal standard of proof. Nonetheless, taken in combination with the Brereton report, there is overwhelming evidence that there was grave misconduct by some Australian soldiers in Afghanistan.
There are some critical things to remember. First, it was a tragedy for the Afghans wrongly killed, and for their families. But the overwhelming majority of Australian soldiers who served in Afghanistan, or who have served anywhere, have conducted themselves with decency and integrity, and borne risks that normal Australians never have to consider. We remain in their debt.
It is also the case that soldiers sent on repeated deployments to Afghanistan faced mounting psychological and personal pressures, which ultimately hurt their judgment.
Nonetheless, any Australian soldier must always bear responsibility for their own actions. Every soldier who wears our uniform is bound by the rules of war, the specific rules of engagement under which they are operating, and the general rules of morality.
All these laws allow and sometimes require fierce and deadly combat. But they don’t allow for the intentional killing of civilians or of prisoners.
All these laws allow and sometimes require fierce and deadly combat. But they don’t allow for the intentional killing of civilians or of prisoners.
There are a couple of lessons to be internalised going forward. The first is that it was insane for Australia to have a policy effectively of restricting active combat first to the SAS, and later to the SAS and Commandos. This grave policy error goes back to the Howard government and an understandable desire to avoid Australian casualties. It was thought the SAS could take care of itself. It could do the military job required and suffer minimal casualties.
But war is war. You’re either in it or you’re not. You shouldn’t undertake military action just to show an ally your heart’s in the right place. There must always be a real military purpose to any military action.
The bulk of Australian Army units deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq were never allowed to go near combat if they could avoid it.
By having the perverse view that the only part of the whole Australian Defence Force it would allow into combat was the special forces, the government placed an impossible burden on this tiny tip of the spear, and also engendered great resentment among other elements of the army who rightly felt their skills and capabilities were being underrated.
Of course, the SAS itself almost always wants to be deployed. It has a bias for action, as they say.
But governments must be wiser than this.