How to deal with the unappeasable Putin

Russian President Vladimir Putin giving a speech for the International Women's Day, in Moscow.

Russia is internationally isolated, its forces are stuck in the mud in Ukraine, and it faces the toughest array of economic sanctions ever imposed on a great power. Yet Russian armies continue to advance, China appears to back Vladimir Putin’s play, Ukrainian negotiators are considering concession to some Russian demands, and Europe remains vulnerable to Russian energy blackmail.

So: Is Mr. Putin a political genius we underestimate at our peril, or is he an overrated buffoon who, intoxicated by a long run of good luck, has fatally misjudged his prospects in Ukraine?

History offers another way to think about figures like Mr. Putin. Benito Mussolini had an astonishing career, creating a political movement that ruled Italy for 20 years. His methods often were morally repugnant, but the Fascist movement he created found sympathizers and imitators from Germany to Japan. There was a time when Fascist Italy looked to be leading Europe out of the “decadence” of parliamentary democracy toward a postliberal era.

But Mussolini had an Achilles’ heel. His political project of re-creating the Roman Empire couldn’t be realized. He could build the most powerful political movement in modern Italian history, he could conquer Ethiopia, he could help Franco win the Spanish Civil War, but none of it brought his goal within reach.

Italian dictator Benito Mussolini shown in 1936.

Like Mussolini, Mr. Putin has a long record of success. The war in Chechnya was ugly, but he began his time in office by ending what many thought was the inevitable dissolution of the Russian Federation and reasserting Moscow’s control over its restive regions. Coming to power when oligarchs dominated Russian politics, Mr. Putin skillfully played them against one another until he emerged as the unrivaled master of the Russian scene.

He reasserted Russian power in international relations. Post-Soviet Russia was a helpless and weak state, unable to halt the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or to influence American and European power in the Balkans and Central Asia. A combination of adroit diplomacy and the ruthless use of force gave Mr. Putin a de facto veto on NATO expansion after his 2008 invasion of Georgia. In 2014 he snatched Crimea and invaded the Donbas, drawing only halfhearted sanctions from a divided West.

Defying the sanctions, and profiting from the Obama administration’s strategic confusion, Mr. Putin seized the opportunity of the Syrian civil war to support longtime Russian ally Bashar al-Assad, making a mockery of John Kerry’s pompous demand that Mr. Assad had to go.

Italian dictator Benito Mussolini (L) and Nazi leader Adolf Hitler just before the four power conference in Munich, Germany in 1938.

Russia’s new role in Syria gave it an entrée into Middle East politics, which it used to build a close relationship with Israel and the Arab oil producers. Employing mercenary organizations like the Wagner Group, Mr. Putin was able to extend Russian power into Libya and sub-Saharan Africa, forcing the French out of Mali. By selling sophisticated antiaircraft weapons to Turkey, he drove a wedge into NATO even as he cultivated close relations with countries like Hungary and Italy in ways that undercut European Union cohesion.

Like Mussolini, Mr. Putin was fortunate to face an ungifted generation of Western leaders. Nobody will be expanding Mount Rushmore with sculptures memorializing any of America’s post-Cold War presidents, and the generation of European leaders that included figures like Gerhard Schröder and François Hollande will not long be remembered. Playing a weak hand aggressively, Mr. Putin managed to divide and confuse this motley crew long enough to threaten the Western order in Europe and reassert Russia’s place among the great powers.

But as Mussolini discovered, diplomatic and even military victories cannot make an impossible dream come true. Mussolini was unable to build an Italian economy that could support his ambitions or a military capable of rivaling the great powers like Germany and Britain. This is where the limits of Mr. Putin’s achievements also seem to lie. After 20 years in power, he has failed to equip Russia with either the economy or the military that a great power needs. And because his power rests on such narrow and unsatisfactory foundations, his foreign policy remains one of brinkmanship and adventurism that is always vulnerable should his adversaries call his bluff—or if he miscalculates and bites off more than he can chew.

The best way to think about Mr. Putin is as a gifted tactician committed to a strategic impossibility: for Russia to regain the superpower status once held by the Soviet Union. Such leaders are unappeasable because their goals can never be reached. The rise of China, Russia’s continuing demographic decline, and its continuing inability to create a modern and dynamic economy will not end because Russian flags fly over the ruins of Kyiv.

There are two mistakes we can make about figures like Mr. Putin. One is to underestimate their talent for troublemaking if they don’t get what they want. The other is to believe that by giving in to their demands we can quiet them down. The West has made both mistakes with Mr. Putin in the past. We must try to do better now.

The Wall Street Journal