Banking royal commission live: insurance hearings

CBA stuck to outdated medical definitions for years despite medical advice it was discriminating against people.

CommInsure's Helen Troup appearing at the financial services royal commission hearings on insurance. Picture: Supplied.

• Commercial considerations
• ‘Impact profit’
• ‘May discriminate against people’
• PM’s regret
• No pay impact
• Backdating definitions
• CBA ‘very adversarial’
• Serious misconduct
• CBA misled FOS
• Redacted advice
• Not a heart attack
• Definitions of heart attack
• CommInsure’s Helen Troup appears
• Denied claims
• Freedom shares crash
• Freedom’s St Andrews acquisition
• ‘As difficult as possible’
• ‘Bloody whinger’
• 25 ‘sad faces’
• Retention agents and commissions
• ‘Not taking no for an answer’
• Retention strategies

The Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry is conducting its sixth round of hearings, focused on insurance, in Melbourne. Follow the proceedings with us live from 9am each day.

4.30pm: Hearing adjourned

With day three of the insurance round of the financial services royal commission ended, here’s what we learned:

• Call centre staff at Freedom Insurance who were paid to dissuade customers from cancelling their expensive funeral insurance joked about a father who attempted to cancel cover wrongly sold to his son, who has Down’s syndrome, as a “bloody whinger”, and said his son “sounds not normal”.
• Freedom received more than policy cancellation 70 calls a day over the last financial year, but only a quarter of these customers were successful in having the policies terminated, thanks mainly to “retention agents” who persuaded them to remain.
• Across the industry, customers face lengthy delays or a high likelihood of claims denial at some companies. Meanwhile, many life insurers have paid bonuses to claims handling staff for resolving claims.
• Commonwealth Bank denied the claim of a life insurance customer who suffered a heart attack by using out-of-date medical definitions, we heard. It then then misled the Financial Ombudsman Service by covering up advice it had received from a doctor in relation to an updated definition when the customer complained. Two separate chief medical officers had recommended CommInsure update and backdate its definitions for a heart attack.
• Former CommInsure boss Helen Troup admitted the decisions about how far to backdate an updated medical definition were commercially driven and that those decisions had an adverse impact on customers.

Thanks for following the procedings with us today. The hearing will resume at 9.45am, with Ms Troup set to face the spotlight again.

4.22pm: Motivated by commercial considerations

Has CommInsure taken steps to make sure more than just commercial considerations are taken into account in its product review processes, Ms Orr asks.

Ms Troup says yes, the company is more focused on what is changing, and on customer advocacy.

Ms Troup concedes that CommInsure knew from at least 2012 that its heart attack definition didn’t reflect the universal definition of heart attack.

She accepts that until the name was changed to “heart attack of specified severity” in 2013 people would have thought the policy was intended to apply to all heart attacks.

She accepts that in making decisions not to update the definition between 2011 and 2016, CMLA was motivated by commercial considerations.

And the company did not adequately take into account the interests of its customers in making those decisions, she agrees.

And with that, the hearing adjourns.

That’s it for today. Ms Troup will be back at 9.45am.

4.17pm Customer advocacy

CommInsure launched a project to “understand’ how it was positioned in terms of customer advocacy.

The review found some trauma definitions such as heart attack were outdated.

The review defined “low” and “high” customer advocacy - whether definitions were confusing, in line with medical advances, whether claims are declined.

The review found the clinical definition of heart attack had changed, and customers may be told they have had a heart attack but did not meet the CommInsure definition and thus were unable to claim.

By late 2015, nothing had been done about this issue, which had been identified in 2012.

Ms Troup concedes this was not acceptable.

After this report CommInsure started a project to review the heart attack definition.

And then the Four Corners report came out.

4.13pm: ‘Impact profit’

We move to April 2012, when another review was prepared noting that CommInsure might start losing revenue if it wasn’t competitive in its trauma cover.

There was no reference to the chief medical officer’s wish to move to the universal definition from 2007.

A proposal to introduce a partial benefit for minor heart attacks was provided to reinsurers.

In August 2012 the third universal definition of heart attacks was published.

The reinsurer didn’t support the introduction of a partial benefit for minor heart attacks but the product team kept looking at this.

In March 2013 it was decided that the partial benefit for minor heart attacks wouldn’t be included in the upcoming product update because of concerns this would “impact profit”.

The chief medical officer’s concerns about the impact on customers fell by the wayside.

Another product development cycle began, and it reintroduced the proposal for a partial benefit for a limited heart attack, which the reinsurer was concerned about.

By May 2014 a number of other insurers had updated their definitions. Ms Troup concedes CommInsure’s failure to do so was a commercial misjudgment with adverse consequences for CommInsure policyholders.

In May 2014, a new chief medical officer, Dr Koh, recommended the heart attack definition be updated.

Dr Koh has been commenting on this afternoon’s developments on Twitter.

What weight do you give to your chief medical officer's recommendation on amending outdated medical definitions.... [pin drops] #banksrc

— Dr Koh Whistleblower (@drkohComminsure) September 12, 2018

4.02pm: ‘May discriminate against people’

The commission looks at internal emails referring to CommInsure discussions about changing its heart attack definition.

Clients had been diagnosed as having heart attack, but they were not meeting the company definition, the email says.

So this was recognised within CommInsure by April 2012.

Ms Orr is struggling with a medical definition for “PCI” and Commissioner Kenneth Hayne interjects to explain it’s detailed further up the page: percutaneous coronary intervention. We’ve heard very little from the commissioner during this round of hearings.

Ms Orr moves on to “MI claims”.

“I will wait for the commissioner to tell me that myocardial infarction would be what MI stands for,” Ms Orr says.

“You get to an age where these things become very important to you, Ms Orr,” the commissioner replies.

The hearing erupts in laughter; an unusually light moment in a session that has been heavy on detail and definitions.

But we continue with the email.

CommInsure conservatively estimated a 25 per cent increase in cost would be brought on by moving to the universal definition of myocardial infarction.

Ms Troup acknowledges the cost issue: if you increase claims coverage it would have an impact on premiums.

The chief medical officer emailed to say he would personally move to the universal definition from 2007: the 99th percentile figure varies depending on the machine used by the lab so “our absolute level may discriminate against people and the 99th percentile is lower in women and so it is harder for women to reach our level which is not ideal”.

Ms Troup concludes that there was a lot of discussion, but the business didn’t move forward on changing the definition and it should have.

3.54pm: Outdated definition

In February 2012 there was another discussion about CommInsure’s heart attack definition.

In April that year there were internal meetings to discuss a potential review of the definition.

We look at an internal email about a meeting held to discuss this.

The email mentions discussions about moving to a “severity based definition”. Ms Troup explains this means a partial payment for less severe heart attacks, because the new Troponin levels were picking up smaller and smaller heart attacks.

The email also mentions using the 99th percentile measure which would align the company with American and European definitions.

So by March 2012, it was known in CommInsure that its policies didn’t reflect current medical definitions, Ms Troup concedes.

The email suggests seeking actuarial advice on pricing impact, and contacting the group’s reinsurer, who is a party to the coverage.

3.47pm: Why didn’t CommInsure change earlier?

By what process does CommInsure update medical definitions, Ms Orr asks.

It’s similar to any product review, we hear. Every year there’s an annual product review, which was an opportunity for any medical definition to be reviewed.

In house researchers can also highlight changes in the market or from doctors at any time.

The definition of heart attack in the trauma policies was unchanged from July 2005 to March 2016. There were times during that long period when CommInsure considered updating the definitions, but decided not to.

In 2007 a global expert taskforce published a paper setting out a universal definition of heart attack. Their preferred way to work out if there was a heart attack was by measuring Troponin levels to the 99th percentile of a normal reference population. That’s because different tests for the level of Troponin had different levels of sensitivity.

In 2012, the taskforce published an update endorsing the 99th percentile measure and recommended different reference values for men and women. At the time, CommInsure’s definition didn’t make reference to the 99th per centile, and instead required an elevation of Troponin I levels above 2.0 micrograms per litre, regardless of the sensitivity of the test and whether the insured was male or female.

Ms Troup accepts it was known in CommInsure from at least early 2012 that CommInsure’s definition of heart attack didn’t reflect the universal definition of heart attack.

There was a proposal in September 2011 to update the heart attack definition in the next product development cycle, to use the 99th percentile measure. But this wasn’t adopted.

The team was working through “pricing”, Ms Troup says, before catching herself.

But there doesn’t seem to be a document that explains the decision.

Greg Brown 3.40pm: PM’s regret

Meanwhile, in federal parliament, new Prime Minister Scott Morrison has responded to opposition attacks over his initial resistance to the establishment of the royal commission.

Mr Morrison reiterated his regret for opposing the banking royal commission for so long.

“I’m pleased the royal commission is now proceeding. The matters presented at the royal commission are deeply disturbing but, as (Mr Bowen) would know, the matters they are investigating on so many occasions happened on the watch of those who sat opposite,” he says.

“They did not initiate a royal commission when they were in government.”

3.39pm: No pay impact

CommInsure reviewed its declined heart attack claims going back to October 2012.

It also looked at rheumatoid arthritis, which also had a definition change.

Of the 165 possibly relevant claims, 119 were determined to be out of scope. Of the rest, 23 didn’t meet the new definition, but 17 heart attack claims that were denied under the old definition were found to meet the updated definition.

The second phase of the review was only covering heart attack cases. There were 33 claims that were denied under the old definition but met the updated definition. This resulted in CommInsure paying $4.257 million in claims.

The figures here don’t include our earlier case study of an insured heart attack victim, who had received an ex gratia payment by this stage, Ms Troup explains.

She accepts that a significant amount of money was paid to the 33 claimants as a result of the backdating of definitions to Oct 2012.

She also accepts CommInsure should have simply updated the definition in 2012, and to not update it at that time was a decision that fell below community standards.

There were no remuneration consequences for anyone at CommInsure from all of this, Ms Troup reveals.

Ms Troup did have remuneration consequences as a result of the investigations - there was a payment due in the middle of the investigation and about a third of that was held back until the investigation was complete.

In the end, however, it was still paid.

Ms Troup accepts the decision not to update the heart attack definition in 2014 fell below community standards, and that the consequences of those decisions are clear when we see how many people would have had their claims awarded if the updated definition had been made at either of those points.

3.26pm: Costs of updating definitions

The commission turns to CMLA board minute meetings from 9 March 2016 two days after the ABC Four Corners story.

There were questions about backdating the updated definition to May 11 2014.

Head of life product and strategy Dr Phillips answered questions about the appropriateness of the date, saying that even though the definition changed in 2012, this was not immediately adopted through the industry.

Thus the 11 May 2014 date put the company in the middle of the range of when its competitors had moved.

But Ms Troup rejects Ms Orr’s strong suggestion that being in the middle of its competitors was the main reason why CBA had picked this date.

But there would have been no harm in explaining this to FOS, she says.

After receiving the letter from Mr Kell, CommInsure decided to backdate the heart attack changes even earlier to October 2012, making the decision in time to include it in ASIC’s media release the next day.

Did CommInsure know what position ASIC was going to take? They had been communicating, and Ms Troup assumes the company would have had advance notice.

An email from the CMLA board chairman Mr Austin is displayed.

By this time, the board thinks there is a sound rationale for picking the May 2014 date , because it thinks changing the decision at that time would have been more appropriate decision commercially and in the interests of policyholders.

Management authorised Ms Troup and Annabel Spring to backdate the definition further.

But actuarial advice was needed first.

There had already been some actuarial work done in 2016 about the cost of backdating to 2014, showing an original estimate of a $14.7 million cost. But the actual cost was only $2.5 million. That lower than expected cost was why CommInsure could decide so quickly after receiving ASIC’s final letter to backdate further, to October 2012, Ms Orr suggests, and Ms Troup agrees.

3.16pm: Backdating definitions

Why did CommInsure decide, in 2016, to backdate the updated heart attack definition to May 2014, Ms Orr wants to know.

Because that was the date of the most recent full product review, Ms Troup says.

Why else?

There was advice from the product team and a consideration of how many other insurers had moved in the market.

There are 12 or 14 providers in the market and seven had moved by 11 May 2014. These seven had moved between 2012 and 2014.

But the movements by the competitors weren’t mentioned in the press release.

Was the primary reason for picking 11 May 2014 that it was in the middle of the range of dates when competitors updated their definitions, Ms Orr asks

It was one reason, but not the primary reason, Ms Troup says.

First the analysis looked at the company’s product review cycles and when the last time this should have been done was. The analysis of competitor moves was done to complement this, she says.

3.10pm: ‘Falls short of community expectations’

Meanwhile ASIC was inquiring into claims handling practices in life insurance.

ASIC issued a media release with its findings.

The day before the media release, ASIC deputy chairman Peter Kell wrote to the CMLA chairman to say ASIC’s investigation found CMLA had not contravened the law other than advertising trauma cover for heart attack, which was still being looked at, but there were a “number of areas of concern where we expect improvements to be made”.

Mr Kell warned of out-of-date medical definitions for heart attack in trauma cover.

Mr Kell was “concerned about the use of definitions which have become outdated” and “the potential for customers to misunderstand the terms of their policies due to the use of confusing and unclear definitions”, adding “the use of definitions that fell significantly short of consumer expectations”.

CBA’s use of outdated definitions was “not a breach of the duty of utmost good faith” but ASIC was concerned it falls short of community expectations.

Mr Kell refers to an industry expert consensus document on heart attack definitions endorsing the use of Troponin as a means of detecting heart attacks and labs should use a cut-off value of the 99th percentile to work out if there had been a heart attack.

Mr Kell said there was not a “robust” rationale in picking 11 May 2014 as the effective date of the change as the report was published in 2012 - this was not contrary to the law but has “unfairly impacted on some customers” and it would have been better to pick an earlier date, and seven other insurers had updated their definition by 11 May 2014.

2.59pm: What ASIC said

We turn to a letter that ASIC sent to CMLA dealing with the matter alleged to be serious misconduct.

ASIC took the view that CMLA should have given FOS a copy of the whole unredacted medical opinion and failing to do so was likely contrary to its obligations under the FOS terms of reference.

ASIC said that CMLA’s wording was likely to mislead, when it declined a request to provide a medical report.

ASIC didn’t see any evidence that CMLA intended to mislead FOS, but it was likely to and in fact did mislead FOS.

What action did ASIC take?

ASIC encouraged the company not to do this again.

What changes has CMLA made as a result?

Interaction between CommInsure and group customer relations needed to improve, and claims reviews needed to be at the right level of seniority, Ms Troup says.

2.55pm: CBA ‘very adversarial’

Ms Orr gets some more confessions.

Ms Troup concedes that CommInsure’s decision to redact the medical opinion it gave to FOS fell below community standards, as did the decision not to explain that redaction.

She accepts CBA misled FOS by implying the medical opinion had not already been obtained. She agrees CBA failed to comply with FOS’s terms of reference by not providing information FOS requested, and she accepts CBA’s conduct contributed to delay in resolving the complaint.

She also agrees the actions affected the trust relationship with FOS. The bank would have come across “as very adversarial”.

CBA decided to audit its handling of the matter.

But the audit didn’t look at CMLA’s process or rationale in working out the back date for the revised heart attack definition, and also didn’t look at whether the conduct was serious misconduct/a breach of duty of utmost good faith/whether the conduct should be reported to ASIC as serious misconduct.

The conduct had been reported to ASIC so the company didn’t feel it needed to look at it further, Ms Troup says.

It was thought that the duty of utmost good faith applied to the insured - but in fact it applies to insurer and insured.

The review didn’t find any evidence suggesting CMLA sought to intentionally mislead FOS.

But the review found processes weaknesses, imprecise definitions, an ineffective process in group customer relations. The decision to redact the medical decision was found to be a poor decision. There was also a reference to the letter from FOS responding to the challenge to their jurisdiction, that wasn’t uploaded into a bank system.

2.46pm: CBA did not agree

Next, CommInsure replied to FOS, saying the matter was resolved in favour of the insured and that it did not agree that any delay prejudiced the outcome.

The company said it did “regret” that the information gathering process did not run smoothly but did not agree that its actions were “serious misconduct” and “found no evidence to support a conclusion that CMLA intended to deliberately mislead FOS as to the existence of the medical opinion”.

The company did not acknowledge in this letter that it didn’t comply with its obligations under the FOS terms of reference, and didn’t acknowledge that it hadn’t been frank and open in its dealings.

Ms Troup concedes this was not an appropriate response, and that what CommInsure should have done was to acknowledge its mistakes: the redaction, continuing to challenge the jurisdiction, and not providing more information about the heart attack.

FOS replied, saying CommInsure’s response was “not persuasive”, acknowledging the company has been engaging with ASIC’s review over claims handling, and said it would report the matter to ASIC.

2.41pm: Serious misconduct

FOS declined CommInsure’s request for another meeting and issued a recommendation.

The recommendation was in favour of the insured but CommInsure rejected the recommendation.

CommInsure wrote to FOS to say its decision to backdate the upgrade for the heart attack definition to May 2014 was not reviewable by FOS and that was a reasonable choice.

But CMLA acknowledged the insured’s expectations had been “significantly raised” and decided to offer the insured an amount equal to the sum insured less previous partial payments on an ex gratia basis.

FOS wrote back to say: “The CMLA statements misled us to believe CMLA did not and would not obtain the relevant medical evidence requested.

“The statements were made despite the fact that CMLA already had that evidence in its possession.”

FOS said this was a “deliberate failure to comply” with the FOS terms of reference and the conduct caused delay in the handling of the investigation and could have prejudiced the outcome.

FOS decided this behaviour may amount to “serious misconduct”.

2.35pm: Requests for information

The commission is looking at ASIC’s regulatory guide about external dispute resolution schemes.

The guide says companies can only ask to withhold documents if they would endanger a third party or compromise a scheme member’s general security.

We now look at FOS’s terms of reference. These say that parties to a dispute have to provide any information that FOS considers necessary.

That is, unless providing information would breach a duty of confidentiality to a third party, would breach a court order/prejudice a police investigation, or the information doesn’t exist.

Did CommInsure try to satisfy FOS of any of these matters above?

None of them applied, did they, Ms Orr suggests.

Ms Troup agrees.

CMLA simply refused to provide the information sought by FOS because it didn’t believe it was relevant, Ms Troup concedes.

That was not an approach permitted by the ASIC regulatory guide or FOS’s terms of reference, she admits.

So CommInsure acted inconsistently with the guide and the terms of reference, and also failed to be open and transparent in its dealings with FOS, she agrees.

This was a “misguided attempt’ by staff who didn’t think the information was relevant, Ms Troup says. “I wouldn’t have made that decision myself.”

2.29pm: ‘Not relevant’

A couple of months later, FOS wrote to CMLA with more information it had received from the insured. It asked for an unredacted copy of the medical opinion, and asked how CMLA’s heart attack definition compared to the state of medical practice in Aug 2013, and to definitions from other insurers.

FOS wondered how CommInsure justified its decision to backdate the definition to May 2014, not August 2013 or earlier.

This caused more concern at CBA.

The group customer relations team tried to explain its concerns to FOS, and again challenged FOS’s jurisdiction in a meeting.

Ms Troup said this was not appropriate. She can’t say whether the CBA staff knew FOS had made the determination and decided to keep challenging its jurisdiction, or whether they didn’t know of the determination.

After the meeting, FOS asked CBA again for an unredacted copy of the medical opinion.

Eventually, CBA sent the unredacted opinion - more than three months after FOS first asked for it.

But instead of responding in detail to FOS’s request for information about how CommInsure’s heart attack definition compared to the state of medical practice in August 2013 and the definitions of other insurers, CBA asked for yet another meeting, and said those questions were not relevant to assessing the insured’s claim.

2.23pm: CBA misled FOS

Back from lunch, the commission returns to an email that CBA’s group customer officer sent to the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS).

Its attachment was the medical opinion from medical officer Dr Carless, with part of the opinion redacted so it couldn’t be read.

The email declined FOS’s request to obtain or provide a medical report to assess whether the applicant would satisfy the upgraded definition of heart attack.

CBA’s Helen Troup concedes that this conveyed that CommInsure didn’t already have such a medical opinion - even though it did - and the opinion it had was favourable to the insured.

Ms Troup admits the email was misleading. It was “absolutely not” acceptable that CommInsure mislead FOS.

CommInsure challenged FOS’s jurisdiction to entertain the dispute.

Why did CommInsure say the dispute was outside FOS’s jurisdiction after FOS had rejected that argument, Ms Orr asks.

Ms Troup thinks the staff member concerned had been on leave when the earlier FOS correspondence had arrived, and the email wasn’t registered into the case management system until later, even though it should have been.

CommInsure shouldn’t have continued to challenge FOS’s jurisdiction, she agrees.

1.10pm: Redacted advice

The commission sees an internal CommInsure email in which staff advise not progressing the dispute. They want to invoke FOS’s discretion on the basis that the case related to a matter of commercial judgment for CommInsure.

FOS rejected the challenge to its jurisdiction.

Ms Troup doesn’t think it’s standard for CB to look for ways to challenge FOS’s jurisdiction.

FOS pushed ahead with the complaint.

A FOS letter discusses the updated medical definition and CommInsure’s change to its definitions.

FOS asks for supporting information from CommInsure, including a medical opinion by CommInsure’s chief medical officer against the 2013 policy definition. FOS also asked CommInsure’s chief medical officer to review the insured’s medical circumstances against the May 2014 policy definition.

Ms Troup concedes the FOS letter was a matter of concern in CommInsure, and the customer resolutions manager thought FOS’s position potentially posed a systemic issue for CommInsure. The head of priority customer relations said CMLA should push back.

Ms Troup says the matter of concern was FOS determining what the terms of the contract were and when the heart attack definition should apply.

“If FOS could determine when to apply a definition from, that would make it fairly challenging for us to run our business,” Ms Troup says.

The customer resolution officer emails FOS with the medical officer’s review of the claim against the old definition. The email declined a request to provide a medical report to assess whether the applicant would satisfy the upgraded definition, arguing it met the relevant 2013 definition of a heart attack and did not need to be assessed against the new criteria/

A document was enclosed with the email that group customer relations sent to FOS: a copy of Dr Carless’s email sent to the customer resolution officer in April, which included his medical opinion.

The first page of Dr Carless’s email summarised the history of the matter and then there was a table with a point by point assessment of the claim under the old definition.

Then Dr Carless concluded that the insured did not meet the 2013 definition. In the document sent to FOS, the rest of the medical opinion was redacted.

But the commission sees the unredacted version, which included Dr Carless’ opinion that the insured did meet the updated definition of heart attack.

On that telling point, the commission breaks for lunch and will resume at 2.15.

1.02pm: Ex-gratia payment denied

The commission is looking at a FOS complaint, where the insured says the public hospital “evidently did not do a specific type of Troponin blood test” so the readings didn’t meet CommInsure’s definition despite “plenty of doctor file notes to the contrary”.

He insured saw the media reports about the heart attack definition and wanted his claim reconsidered.

His case was referred internally around the bank, and the customer resolution manager asked for more information from the insured, but also told him the updated heart attack definition didn’t apply to the claim he made in January 2014, when the new definition only applied from 11 May 2013.

Ms Troup concedes this was likely to confuse the insured or raise his hopes.

The medical consultant Dr Carless listed a point by point breakdown and then said overall the condition did not meet the definition.

Then the doctor referred to the insured’s request on whether the updated definition would be met.

The doctor set out his reasoning, saying the rise of cardiac biomarkers means the condition does meet the updated definition.

But the definition only applied to claims made after 11 May 2014.

The customer resolution officer suggested considering an ex-gratia payment.

But no ex-gratia payment was made.

Ms Troup: “At the time, the consideration was the claim didn’t meet the definition at the time and it wasn’t considered appropriate for ex-gratia.”

Ms Orr suggests that the claimant only just missed out.

Ms Troup says the 1.9 figure for the Troponin level is due to the angioplasty - so characterising the level as “just below 2” isn’t what she understands. But she accepts the insured was only a few months out of the definition.

12.41pm: Not a heart attack

CBA medical officer Dr Alan Carless’ opinion was the insured met the definition for coronary artery angioplasty but there was not enough evidence he met the definition of heart attack.

The case manager told the insured this. The insured provided more medical information, and received the same response, then gave more information, including the fact that his level of Troponin I rose from 0.4 to 1.9 micrograms per litre during the trauma event. The definition of heart attack was a level of 2.0 or more.

The doctor asked for more information.

The medical officer’s opinion was the insured had a rise in Troponin I but to a level less than 2.0 mcg/L, so the insured did not meet the policy definition for heart attack of specified severity.

CommInsure denied the insured’s claim to be paid the full trauma benefit but did pay $10,000 for meeting the definition of coronary artery angioplasty.

The insured got in touch with CommInsure to say his GP was amazed the company did not pay out, but no change was made to the decision.

The insured made a complaint in 2014 and the complaint was handled by CBA group customer relations rather than CommInsure. The decision was not altered. By July 2014 CommInsure considered the case was resolved, Ms Orr tells the commission.

12.35pm: Definitions of heart attack

The definition of heart attack was updated over the following years, the commission hears.

There was a change in October 2002 and another change in 2005 and then in 2013 the name of the condition changed from “heart attack” to “heart attack of specified severity” but otherwise the definition was the same.

There was another change to the definition in March 2016.

So other than a name change there was no change to the definition in almost 11 years, Ms Orr notes.

Focus turns to the highly technical definition, with Ms Orr acknowledging that Ms Troup is not a doctor, but asking if she has a general familiarity with the material.

“It will be a race to see which of us knows least about these matters,” senior counsel assisting Rowena Orr QC quips.

But they agree that troponin levels can be used in the diagnosis of heart attacks.

The insured’s claim form is displayed. The insured has ticked “heart attack”.

The insured was hospitalised in 2014. He was told he’d need either bypass surgery or stents and he chose stents, which happened in three separate operations over the following weeks.

The insured also ticked “coronary artery angioplasty”.

When CommInsure receives a claim, it assigns the claim to a case manager.

The case managers assess whether all the relevant medical material has been provided, and if they need more information they seek it from the insured or a hospital or doctor. Then the claim would go to the company’s medical officer, then to the case manager to decide whether to accept or decline the case.

12.27pm: CommInsure’s Helen Troup appears

CommInsure executive general manager Helen Troup takes the stand.

CBA has a life and general insurance business. The life insurance business is run through a company called Commonwealth Insurance Limited.

CBA sold its life insurance business to AIA in 2017 but the transaction hasn’t completed yet so the business is still part of CommInsure.

Why did CBA sell its life insurance business?

Ms Troup thinks it was part of a broader strategy of simplifying the bank.

The questions will focus on someone known only as “the insured”, who had a heart attack.

The insured took out a total care policy with Colonial in 2000. Colonial was later acquired by CommInsure.

The total care plan includes life care, “recuperator” (trauma cover) and permanent care (TPD).

The trauma cover pays a lump sum if the insured survives after one on a list of disorders - including heart disorders such as heart attack and coronary artery angioplasty.

Heart attack means the death of part of the heart muscle, myocardium, as a result of inadequate blood supply. There is a detailed medical definition.

If the insured had a heart attack under this definition he was entitled to the sum insured, $100,000.

The policy also defines coronary artery angioplasty - if the insured had this he would have been entitled to a lesser benefit of $10,000.

The policy says that if future versions of the product were introduced, the policy would be automatically be upgraded, provided the insured would not be disadvantaged.

So if a medical definition was updated, the insured would be entitled to rely either on the definition that applied at the time of purchasing the policy or an updated definition, and would not be disadvantaged.

12.13pm: Claims and remuneration

Ms Orr now asks how claims handling staff get paid.

What an ominous question, after recent revelations at the commission to how pay structures have affected consumer outcomes.

Many life insurers have rewarded claims handling staff for the finalisation or closure of claims.

For example, Westpac said in 2013 it had a measure called “managing claims results” but removed it later.

In 2016, CMLA (CommInsure) scored staff based on claims’ financial outcomes such as termination rates and loss ratios, which the company later removed.

ANZ said before 2017 OnePath claims staff generally had objects related to the ratio of premiums received to claims payments made, and the number of claims closed against overall business plans.

TAL said in 2015 50 per cent of claims case managers scorecard was related to “business matters”, including if they achieved budgeted profit targets by managing claims to outcomes in line with assumptions underpinning loss ratio targets.

Suncorp Life said in 2014, profit and financials had a 15 per cent weighting in its scorecard for case managers and claims advisers, and one relevant measure was expenditure on individual claims over a 12 month period. For 2015 to 17, profit/financials rose to a 40 per cent weighting. In 2018 it rose again to a 50 per cent weighting.

Suncorp Life admitted other benefits to encourage the resolution of claims.

It ran a claims resolution drive from mid 2016 to mid 2017 called The Choice Awards - with marketing like the TV show The Voice.

Claims managers were awarded points for claims resolutions and the release of reserves, which insurers have to hold while claims remain unresolved.

There were cash prizes for individuals and teams with the highest resolution rates and reserve release rates.

The individual with the highest resolutions could win $500 in Coles Myer vouchers, the individual with the highest reserve releases could win $500 in vouchers, the team with the highest resolutions and the team with the highest reserve releases could each win a team lunch worth $50 a head.

12.01pm: Income protection cover

Ms Orr turns to income protection cover - designed for when a policyholder can’t work due to injury or sickness.

CMLA (CommInsure) has told the commission that it engaged in misconduct when it declined an insured’s claim on the basis of an exclusion in his policy, and the insured complained to FOS which ruled in his favour. CMLA said it failed to adequately investigate the circumstances of the termination of the insured’s employment.

Income protection claims are declined at a rate of less than 3 per cent for AMP to about 6.5 per cent for Suncorp Life.

It took 23 days to resolve income protection claims at Zurich on average and about 50 days at AMP and AIA.

11.53am: Claims and delays

Ms Orr is showing the hearing graphs relating to insurance claims across some major insurers in the industry.

Where are customers most likely to have their life cover claims denied?

About 0.3 per cent of claims are declined at AMP, but about 4.4 per cent of claims declined at Suncorp Life.

And how long does it take?

Average resolution times ranged from 10 days at TAL to 78 days at AMP.

What about total and permanent disability cover?

Some insurers require a customer be no longer able to work in any occupation they’re qualified for, while some require only that the customer can no longer work in any occupation. Some insurers require the insured to be under regular medical care.

TPD claims take longer to resolve and can involve complex questions of fact.

The commission has sought a witness statement from MLC about four specific TPD policies where the insured started legal proceedings. MLC has accepted it engaged in misconduct.

In one case, MLC breached its duty to act reasonably as the assessor did not give enough weight to the explanations about matters considered adverse to the claim.

In the second case, MLC breached its duty of good faith after unreasonably delaying a decision.

In the third case, there was also inordinate delay and the claim was handled by four assessors and MLC accepted it breached the good faith duty.

In the fourth case, there was inordinate delay and MCL accepted it had breached the good faith duty.

MLC said the process for oversight of claims files was deficient.

Where are TPD claims declined?

The rate of declined claims ranged from 2 to 3 per cent for Westpac to 9 to 10 per cent for Suncorp Life and Zurich.

What about days to resolve the TPD claim?

Duration ranges from less than 40 days for Zurich to 184 days for Westpac - which also had the lowest rate of declined TPD claims.

But the periods are better than in the 2013 to 14 financial years where the average time ranged from 74 days for Westpac to 389 days for AMP.

Focus turns to trauma cover, if a policyholder is diagnosed with a specified illness or injury. These policies contain lists of the medical conditions where cover is provided.

The rate of declined claims is higher than for other policy types: about 6 to 8 per cent for MLC and Zurich, ranging to more than 28 per cent for MetLife.

It took about 15 days for Zurich to resolve a trauma claim, ranging to 67 days for MLC.

11.45am: Handling life insurance claims

The commission is now going to look at how life insurers handle claims.

Someone making a claim fills in a claims form and then a claims manager might need to ask for more information.

Claims managers can access medical advice and arrange for surveillance of claimants.

Then the claims manager can assess the claim against the policy terms.

The most common reasons to deny claims are lack of eligibility, because the claim was related to a pre-existing medical condition that was excluded, because there was a policy exclusion, or because of non-disclosure/misrepresentation by the claimant.

There are four main types of life insurance: life cover, total and permanent disability (TPD), income protection and trauma.

Life cover claims are declined the least often at about 1.7 per cent; trauma claims are declined most often at 10.5 per cent.

Decisions are made most quickly for life cover days: 27.5 days on average. But TPD claims average 92 days to resolve.

11.29am: Denied claims

Ms Orr has some comments on accidental death policies.

ASIC’s Direct Life Insurance report raised concerns with these policies, as sales calls poorly described the product and its exclusions. A low volume of claims are accepted. And a low value of claims are paid out.

• For example, Auto And General distributed accidental death cover until June 30 but over the past five years paid no amounts in claims.
• ClearView received $38.8m in premiums for accidental death policies over the last five years and received 37 claims.
• For CommInsure, among the accidental claims that had been denied and where the company was able to provide a reason, 96 per cent were denied because the death was not accidental.
• Freedom sold 65,485 accidental death policies over the past five years and received 55 claims.
• Greenstone sold 21,908 accidental death policies over the same time for $46.5m in premiums and received 42 claims, 55 per cent of which were denied.
• MLC sold 1684 accidental death policies, had 103 claims, and denied 61 per cent.
• Onepath sold 3200 policies for $57.6 million in premiums, had 435 claims and did allow 69pc.
• Westpac no longer sells this product but in the two years to 2015 made $103.6 million in premiums and denied 49 per cent of claims.

Ms Orr notes that it was common for claims to be denied because the death was not accidental. Claims could be denied if a death was due to multiple factors even if an accident was the predominant factor.

A number of entities received few or no claims, she says

For example, Zurich was selling about 96 policies a year and received no claims.

Some companies have stopped selling some of their accidental death products, which Ms Orr says may suggest companies are recognising that accidental death policies have limited value to consumers.

“The information provided to the Commission by the 10 entities is consistent with the view recently expressed by ASIC that accidental death products have substantial limitations and limited benefits for consumers,” Ms Orr concludes.

Senior counsel assisting the financial services royal commission Rowena Orr QC. Picture: Supplied.

11.14am: Freedom shares crash

The Australian’s Trading Day blog is reporting shares in Freedom Insurance have crashed 20 per cent on Wednesday after more damning evidence of cultural problems in its sales team at emerging from the royal commission this morning.

Freedom chief risk officer Craig Orton faced questions over how his “retention” staff - paid to convince customers not to cancel their policies - made “totally inappropriate” jokes about a father of a 26-year-old man with Down syndrome who was attempting to cancel his son’s policy.

Mr Orton said he didn’t think the banter, which included labelling the father a “bloody whinger” for trying to cancel his son’s policy, was conduct that fell below community standards, but admitted that it was not appropriate behaviour. Freedom last traded at 12c, down 3c.

Freedom shares have lost 60 per cent since the start of September.

Follow the developments with Trading Day.

11.07am: Changes to the model

Freedom issued a media release last Thursday about its strategic review, noting that a significant proportion of its upfront commission revenue comes from direct sales of funeral insurance, which it needs to change to meet the regulator’s expectations.

What’s the connection between the review and the decisions to stop selling four products through direct sales that Freedom told the commission about on Monday afternoon, Ms Orr asks.

“This came out of the same board meeting where we made the changes to commissions,” Mr Orton says.

So the board meeting minutes reflect the decision to start a review?

Mr Orton can’t remember.

What is the relationship between the review and the board meeting?

Mr Orton says it was soon after that that Freedom had a discussion about what it is moving forward with, because there has been “a lot of regulator activity”.

He is referring to the Direct Life Review and not the breach reports Freedom filed.

An anti-hawking breach report sent a few weeks earlier was also not part of the regulatory scrutiny that sits behind the review.

Mr Orton launches into a speech about how he is looking at improving customer outcomes.

Freedom will keep selling life insurance directly to consumers.

Is it possible for Freedom to sell outbound funeral insurance and direct life insurance more broadly in a way that’s financially viable and legally complaint?

Mr Orton thinks it’s possible, “but there will be changes to the model”.

That’s all Ms Orr wants to know from Mr Orton and he’s told he can step down.

11.00am: St Andrews acquisition

Ms Orr returns to her calculations about Freedom customers who called to cancel.

So 3960 policies had been cancelled or lapsed, out of the 12,720 customers who retained their policies without change, ie 31 per cent.

That is 69 per cent of those who retained policies without change, still held their policy.

And 85 per cent of the customers who tried to cancel but were convinced to keep it on amended terms, continued to hold their policy.

So 7598 consumers retained their policy and made changes and 6466 or 85 per cent still held their policy.

Focus turns to Freedom’s market share.

It has 10 or 11 per cent of new sales in the life insurance market but a lower in force market share.

Ms Orr notes Freedom is buying insurer St Andrews from the Bank of Queensland.

Mr Orton can’t say when the deal will complete beyond having advised the market within financial 2019.

The deal would allow Freedom to have general insurance and life cover, to develop loan protection products, to cover someone’s mortgage while unemployed, Mr Orton says.

10.55am: As difficult as possible

The commission looks at a Freedom retention marketing campaign from July this year, aimed at reversing cancellation attempts made via email or post.

The document was dated 3 July, a few days after ASIC asked for information about retention practices.

Freedom was receiving about 60 written cancellation requests a day and was worried that these had resulted in close to $500,000 in lost annualised premiums in the year to date.

Despite making three tries to call customers who had cancelled in writing, Freedom was only reaching 25 per cent of customers, so it tried to call or text customers.

If customers were still in the free premium period, and decided to stay, they would get a $50 gift card after paying their first premium.

The program was expected to contact 300 policyholders of the 1200 written cancellations per month. Freedom expected 30 would reverse their cancellation for a combined monthly premium of about $30,000, and $15,000 would come in from cancellation reversals in response to a text message, totalling $45,000 monthly. The campaign would cost $1687 a month plus $78 to send the text plus staffing. It assumed only half of the people made the offer would follow through and redeem the gift card.

Mr Orton agrees these processes were designed to make it as difficult as possible for people to cancel policies and to do everything possible to win people back.

Freedom will stop campaigns like this.

Instead it will remove commissions, give customers the chance to opt in after 12 months, and remove the need for retention agents.

10.49am: Christmas money

Since last September, Freedom started to use retention initiatives to keep customers who wanted to cancel their policy.

The commission sees a Freedom training document from September 2017.

Freedom agents were authorised to offer an incentive to customers to keep them: a Christmas Visa card they could use anywhere that accepts Visa or Eftpos, as long as customers paid premiums for the next three months.

“All I want for Christmas is You [crossed out] MONEY”, the training document reads.

Mr Orton says he has stopped the issue of these vouchers.

Retention initiatives like this were still being offered in May, we hear.

Let’s look at a Cancellation Recovery Call Guide script, to try to win back customers who have cancelled, Ms Orr says.

Agents were authorised to try to overcome customer objections to reinstating the policy.

Ms Orr wonders if the community expects that if someone called to cancel a policy, and has managed to “against the odds”, Freedom would leave the customer alone?

Mr Orton: “Most companies will try to win customers back, but the way this was done was not customer focused.”

The script ceased to used by June.

10.43am: ‘Bloody whinger’

Next the agent had an instant messenger conversation with a second consultant.

The retention agent says the dad cancelled.

The colleague says: “Bloody whinger”.

The agent says: “his son sounds not normal tho.

“Strange.

“But the dad sounds like he’s gonna take it further”

The colleague replies “Ahwellll

“I don’t know what he expects to get out of it lol”

Mr Orton has little to say beyond the exchange being “totally inappropriate”.

Freedom didn’t communicate further with Mr Stewart or provide the call recordings in 2016 as requested.

Mr Orton agrees that Freedom’s failure to send the call recordings in a timely way was conduct falling below community expectations.

Was Freedom’s conduct in trying to convince Mr Stewart to keep the policies conduct below community standards?

Mr Orton disagrees, although he doesn’t think it was approripate behaviour.

“It didn’t come across the way that I think she wanted it to come across,” he says.

“But considering that Mr Stewart took it a different way and I can perfectly understand why he did, then yes it’s conduct below consumer expectations.”

10.38am: A change of tone

Ms Orr turns to Mr Stewart’s call requesting to cancel the insurance policy for his son.

“So that will be cancelled?” Mr Stewart asked.

The agent replied “No, I will have to pass you on over to cancellations department.”

The agent suggested there was a legal declaration Freedom had to read over the phone, implying this was the reason for the transfer. Mr Orton concedes this was not the reason for the transfer and the transfer was to send the call to specialist retention officers who are incentivised to save the policy.

Mr Orton, frustrated, is only too willing to say this is a “very poor customer experience”.

“Mm-hmm,” Ms Orr replies.

The retention officer tried to explain the benefits of the policy.

Mr Orton says the agent was trying to calm the situation down.

But he concedes that a better way of calming things down would have been to cancel the policy as requested.

The retention agent said on a number of occasions that final expenses cover was free for the first year but failed to mention the son had also taken out accidental death and accidental injury cover which had premiums payable three days later.

Mr Orton says the retention agent was nervous.

The agent went away then came back and said it wasn’t obvious on the sales call that the son had a disability.

The agent said “you’ve got to understand where we’re coming from”.

But her tone changed after she engaged with Mr Stewart’s son and she said twice she understood where Mr Stewart was coming from.

Freedom Insurance chief operating officer Craig Orton appearing at the financial services royal commission in Melbourne.

10.31am: 25 ‘sad faces’

Ms Orr again turns to the case in which Grant Stewart’s son who has an intellectual disability was sold insurance.

Mr Stewart called to cancel the policy but the agent said the company would look into the recording and then come back to him, which she never did.

Now the commission gets to see what the agent did instead.

The agent’s email begins “Hi girl,” and asks her colleague to look into the case after the policyholder’s dad called in “angry”.

The colleague replies “No.”

The agent responds with 25 “sad-face” emojis.

Mr Orton says the communication is “inappropriate”.

He is lost for words and insists he is here at the company to make changes.

A further internal email shows the agent has listened to the call but “not once does the policyowner mention anything about being disabled”. But the instruction is to get in touch with the father, apologise, and say they will cancel the policy.

Mr Orton can’t understand how someone could listen to the call and form that view.

10.25am: Retention agents and commissions

Ms Orr is closing in.

She wants to know if Freedom retention agents do everything possible to retain a policy that a customer wants to cancel.

Mr Orton agrees the retention has been “too strong’ but not that agents are told “whatever possible”.

Retention agents have KPIs about how many policies they save from cancellation. This is their primary KPI although they also have quality KPIs.

About 30 per cent of retention agents get paid commissions on top of their base salary. Some of them would earn “decent commissions”, Mr Orton says.

Commissions for retention agents are set to be scrapped. Mr Orton accepts that the commission structure has led to poor customer outcomes.

Freedom’s retention cancellation call guide is displayed.

If a customer doesn’t want the policy, agents are told to ask what plans a customer has in place to cover the costs of a funeral should they pass away.

If someone wants to cancel accidental death or injury cover, agents are told to ask what alternative a customer has in place in case they unexpectedly die or are injured and incur medical expenses.

Mr Orton accepts this is an intrusive and inappropriate line of questioning. It’s designed to make the policyholder feel anxious.

10.18am: Hard to cancel

Ms Orr displays an internal ASIC list of discussion points prepared for a meeting with Freedom on 23 May.

There is some concern about whether part of the document is covered by a non-publication order and a page is removed from display.

ASIC had referred to customer reviews of Freedom on public websites, and issues with customers being told they could only cancel policies by phone not in writing and then being put on hold for long periods.

Mr Orton doesn’t think there’s ever been a direction the cancellation needs to be in writing.

Customers have said they were questioned at length by Freedom representatives when trying to cancel.

And customers have said Freedom representatives just hung up on customers who were trying to cancel.

Mr Orton: “I’m not aware of customers being up on. I am aware of some wait times.”

Freedom has also received complaints directly from customers about experiences trying to cancel.

Mr Orton has told the commission of about 27 cases of retention conduct that fell below community standards, the vast majority of complaints were received since the start of February this year, with complaints about Freedom failing to cancel as requested and premiums being deducted after someone cancelled.

10.12am: ‘Not taking no for an answer’

Freedom’s Mr Orton has expressed concerns to ASIC about the quality of the company’s retention calls.

He listened to 400 calls, split between sales and retention, and decided retention calls needed a lot of work and in some instances it was far too difficult for customers to cancel.

“The key problems that I heard were not taking no for an answer on certain calls,” he says.

He told ASIC the manner and tone of some of the calls was unacceptable. But he hadn’t listened to all the 400 calls yet because “it just takes too long”.

ASIC has had specific complaints, and customers have left concerning ratings on public websites, we’re told.

10.01am: Retention rates

The commission sees a letter from Freedom’s Mr Orton to ASIC.

Freedom got 37,584 phone calls from customers to cancel policies from June 1 last year to June 30 this year. The company can link about 28,000 of those calls to one of its policyholders.

That’s an average of about 72 cancellation calls a day.

Ms Orr: “Does that figure trouble you?”

Mr Orton: “It doesn’t trouble me considering the 12 month period if people have had the 12 month period and they’ve enjoyed the coverage and they haven’t paid any premium, but you know any cancellation is troubling.”

Some customers will take the insurance knowing they will cancel, and “that’s okay,” he says.

But many customers won’t go to the trouble of calling to cancel?

“The model is certainly not intended to do that,” he says.

Some 3585 calls, or 13 per cent, of the cancellation calls were made during the cooling off period.

Freedom only started to record why customers were cancelling in March. Forty-seven per cent of customers who called to cancel couldn’t afford the product and 28 per cent didn’t want the cover.

Mr Orton concedes he is troubled by this. He says he has started a review by external consultants.

Seventy-five per cent of policyholders said they didn’t want or couldn’t afford the cover but only 28.5 per cent of the calls resulted in the caller successfully cancelling the policy.

And 44.7 per cent of calls resulted in retention of cover without change, and 26.7 per cent resulted in retention of cover with alterations.

Of the 12,720 calls that resulted in a retention of cover without change, 3960 of those policies have since been cancelled or lapsed.

So 69 per cent of Freedom customers who called to cancel their policy still held it without change.

9.51am: Retention strategies

We’re underway and senior counsel assisting the commission Rowena Orr QC has a quick correction.

In her opening statement, she said MetLife had paid more than $390 million in commissions to advisers over the five years to 2018.

She should have said more than $390,000. The precise figure is $406,500. She apologises for the error.

That done with, Ms Orr now turns back to Freedom chief operating officer Craig Orton, who yesterday gave evidence about the company’s high-pressure sales tactics.

Freedom has 29 retention agents and 65 to 100 sales agents.

Retention agents call customers before their 12-month free period expires to ensure the product is still suitable for their needs, he says.

Agents particularly call customers who have chosen to insure a higher number of lives, to make sure they can still afford the cover.

Some customers want to cancel. “That is fine by us,” he says.

“My words yesterday on true free period were not great,” he says, “But if there’s any doubt at all, now that it’s an opt-in, I think it makes it very clear.”

ASIC has asked Freedom for information about its retention strategies and why customers wanted to cancel policies and how many customers kept their policies.

Freedom has responded to ASIC but didn’t exhibit the response to his statement.

9.35am: Preview

This morning will kick off with Freedom Insurance chief operating officer Craig Orton continuing to be grilled by senior counsel assisting Rowena Orr QC.

Mr Orton yesterday apologised for Freedom’s high-pressure sale of a policy to a young adult with Down syndrome despite the customer not needing or understanding the cover.

Freedom sales agents were pushed to “SELL SELL SELL”, internal emails showed, with the prospect of bonuses such as trips to Bali, cruises on Sydney Harbour and Vespa scooters.

Freedom will stop selling four products through outbound calls but will continue to sell funeral insurance, which makes up the vast bulk of its business, despite corporate regulator ASIC telling companies to cease the sale of life insurance through outbound call centres.

The next witness listed to appear will be Helen Troup, managing director at CBA’s CommInsure.

CommInsure has been in the spotlight for using out-of-date medical definitions to deny claims, which an ASIC review found led to “highly distressing experiences” for some customers.

The hearing will begin at 9.45am.

9.00am: Recap

Here’s what we learned on the second day of insurance hearings.

• Independent life insurer ClearView conceded it “never prioritised compliance” after the royal commission heard details of a series of incentive programs, including one that read “let it rain with gift cards” for call centre staff in a company that broke anti-hawking laws hundreds of thousands of times.
• Counsel assisting Rowena Orr asked ClearView’s Gregory Martin a question that put the entire industry into sharp focus, wondering if it is “possible to sell life insurance in outbound sales calls in a way that is both financially viable and legally compliant?”. “I find it difficult to understand how you can reconcile those things,” Mr Martin said in response.
• Grant Stewart’s adult son who has Down’s syndrome was sold an accidental death policy he did not understand or need by Freedom Insurance, and Mr Stewart faced delays in trying to have the policy cancelled.
• Incredibly, the agent who sold the policy to Mr Stewart’s son had already received warnings from Freedom over his conduct but was not sacked and was indeed encouraged to sell harder.
• Freedom offered commissions to sales agents and non-cash benefits such as a trip to Bali or a Vespa, which Freedom COO Craig Orton agreed encouraged conflicted behaviour by sales agents.
• Freedom has written to ASIC to report a range of breaches of the corporations law. The letter acknowledges Freedom sales agents’ behaviour constitutes a potential breach of the Corporation Act’s section 912A (1)(a), 912A (1) (ca) or 912A (1)(f). That is, for providing services efficiently honestly and fairly, ensuring representatives comply with financial services laws, and to ensure representatives are adequately trained and competent to provide financial services. Freedom told the commission at 3pm yesterday it had decided to stop selling four products through outbound sales, although the company did not make a concurrent ASX announcement.

Royal commission insurance round hearings

Tuesday 11 Spetember: ‘Warning signs were all there’

Monday 10 September: ‘I’d sack them’