Putin sprints to his imagined finish line in Ukraine war

After the setback of the Battle of Kyiv in 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin evolved the theory of victory in his war against Ukraine. Since then, the Russian theory of victory has been to sustain its war effort through mobilisation, casualty tolerance and collaboration with China, Iran and North Korea until Western populations and politicians tire of the conflict.

Russian President Vladimir Putin.Credit: AP

Putin has for some time viewed US President-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration on January 20 this year as a kind of finishing line in this effort. It is a line created through the comments of Trump – who has described Ukraine as a “demolished” country and said it should have made concessions before Russia’s February 2022 invasion – and other American conservatives. It is a line that Putin sees as his salvation in a war that has cost much and returned him little.

Putin is sprinting to that line. There are several components of his accelerated campaign in Ukraine.

First, the Russians have accelerated the number of daily attacks. Despite the huge numbers of casualties suffered by Russia, which Ukraine claims hit 2000 in a single day in late November, its army has been able to replace its losses. It has therefore been able to increase the tempo of its ground combat operations in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Centre for Defence Strategies tracks daily figures about attacks, combat engagements, casualties and many other statistics. According to its figures, this time last year, Russia engaged in an average of fewer than 100 combat actions a day. It now often exceeds 200. In 2024, Russia captured almost 3000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory. One-third of this occurred in the past two months.

Russia has also accelerated its learning and adaptation. It still has problems with quality of individual soldiers but has demonstrated an ability to improve its learning in tactical operations and institutionalising change across its force. This has also allowed it to better exploit weak points on the Ukrainian front line.

In the past few months, Russia has stepped up collaboration with external partners. Iran, China, Russia and North Korea comprise a global coalition with a shared vision of destroying the international system that has existed since the end of World War II.

North Korea has increased its support for Russia by deploying 10,000 soldiers to Kursk, and this might be the first group of many. China and Iran continue to support Russia and, at least in the case of Iran, there is an active “learning community” in which the two nations exchange lessons and ideas about modern war and strategic competition.

Russia has also expanded its sabotage campaign across Europe. The chief of Britain’s intelligence service, the MI5, warned in October that Russian agents had undertaken acts of sabotage “with increasing recklessness”. German intelligence agency heads have also publicly reported a “qualitative and quantitative” increase in Russian, or Russian-sponsored, sabotage across Germany. Difficulties with attributing these attacks to Russia is hindering a response by NATO.

Finally, Russia has accelerated its aerial bombardment of Ukrainian infrastructure and civil targets in the past few months. In one overnight attack in December, Russia fired almost 200 drones and 93 missiles at Ukraine, the most for any phase of this war. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, tracks Russian aerial strikes against Ukraine. Its data shows a significant recent increase in the number of attacks, and the number of weapons employed in each attack, compared with similar periods in 2023 and 2022.

Putin has several objectives for accelerating Ukraine operations in the lead-up to the Trump inauguration. Putin wants to seize enough Ukrainian territory to show progress, and eventually sell a victory, to his people. The Russians are also trying to wear down the Ukrainian armed forces, which are suffering significant shortfalls in frontline manpower and high levels of soldiers absent without leave. This, and the aerial bombardments of Ukrainian cities, aims to demoralise Ukrainians and put further pressure on their government to negotiate.

Ultimately, while Putin’s accelerated campaigns play out in the skies and on the ground of Ukraine and extend into Europe, it is the minds of Western politicians and citizens that have been Putin’s real target in the past couple of months. His plan is to project an air of Russian victory to manipulate a new Trump administration into coercing Ukraine into a peace deal that is not in its best interests.

Success for Putin in his rush to January 20 is far from assured, however. Recent reverses suffered by the Russians in Syria and the Iranians against Israel show that authoritarian regimes are vulnerable. And it is possible that Putin might overplay his hand and appear too dangerous for a new Trump administration to appease or ignore. Putin’s preening confidence in recent statements may see him misread Trump. This could potentially lead to a rise in American support for Ukraine instead of the reduction many are predicting.

In Putin’s haste to cross this imaginary finish line, it is possible for the West to derail his plan by stepping up support for Ukraine. However, this will take astute and courageous strategic leadership from a gaggle of Western leaders who have recently proven to be timid and risk-averse. They have forgotten that they are collectively more powerful than Russia economically and militarily, and very capable of their own accelerated strategic campaign to defeat a reborn Russian imperialism. They just have to decide to do it.

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