Hypersonic missiles are just the start if Australia is to secure its sovereignty

Ukraine has delivered a massive wake-up call to strategists and defence planners everywhere. Our nation’s ability to deter aggression – and to respond and win in the event deterrence fails – is central to protecting its sovereignty in the 21st century.

The news this week that the AUKUS security pact would include a collaborative project to develop hypersonic missiles goes some way to answering this call. As do the announcements that there will be further spending on our missile strike capacity and that Raytheon Australia and Lockheed Martin Australia will be our partners in an accelerated plan to manufacture guided missiles in Australia. But it’s not enough

Hypersonic missiles could travel from Sydney to Perth in less than 30 minutes.

The nature of the threat to Australia has transformed this century as the Chinese Communist Party has invested tens of billions of dollars in a new blue water navy, very long-range strike missiles, bombers, and other capabilities which it might use to coerce Australia and its neighbours.

Hypersonic missiles are difficult to develop but offer a step change in capability. Their speed, more than Mach 5, would see a missile travel from Sydney to Perth in less than 30 minutes. Missiles travelling at such speeds are more difficult for radars to track, give decision makers less time to make decisions on interception and are very hard to shoot down. Match this with long range – well beyond 2000 kilometres – and in sufficient numbers, they will provide this country with an excellent deterrent capability.

In the meantime, the decision to bring forward the homegrown manufacture of guided air and naval missiles will give pause to those who might seek to create mischief in our neighbourhood. But if the ADF is to develop a more robust capability to deter those who might seek to coerce or harm our nation and its interests, there is more to be done. There are four areas that Defence will need to address to provide a more robust deterrent able to survive enemy attack.

First, we need missiles with greater range. The one-thousand-kilometre (plus) range of the guided missiles to be supplied under the accelerated plan is useful. It might allow a missile launched from the Queensland coast to reach somewhere in the Coral Sea. But the most useful deterrents are those that can reach much longer distances to truly complicate the planning of an adversary closer to their home. For this, Australia will probably need longer range cruise and ballistic missiles, able reach deep into the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The navy’s Hobart class destroyers will eventually be armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles, and hypersonic missiles may eventually arrive, but there may be a need for other even longer-range missiles.

The Chinese DF series are medium range ballistic missiles for land and maritime strike at ranges out to 3000 kilometres. Does the ADF need a similar capability? These could be launched from a variety of platforms on the high seas, in the air or from the land. And, if we can produce longer range ballistic missiles, perhaps this might also be the basis for a sovereign space launch capacity as well.

Second, Australia needs more missiles and a wider variety of launch platforms. Modern warfare with precision missiles is expensive. According to some sources, the Ukrainians have fired hundreds of precision missiles a day to blunt the Russian attacks on its country. This means we will need large stock holdings of missiles, and the capacity to replace them quickly.

The ADF also has a limited number of ships that can launch long-range missiles. And aerial platforms that carry these large missiles are easily detected and vulnerable. To ensure Australia has an assured capacity to hold an adversary at threat, we need a third leg for our long-range strike capacity. The US Army and US Marine Corps have programs for land-based long-range strike systems. Unlike highly visible ships and aircraft, these ground-based launcher systems mounted on normal trucks are difficult to find and target. And they are easily deployable beyond our shores. This makes them much likely to survive attack – an important characteristic for any deterrence capability.

Third, the Australian Defence Force needs a battle command system that integrates these missiles into the overall command and control of operations. The Russians, in their disjointed approach to operations in Ukraine have demonstrated what happens when ground, air and missile forces are poorly synchronised. Therefore, to maximise the effectiveness of the new missiles they must be cued by sensors like radars or surveillance drones. Sensor data and control direction are passed on via advanced battle management systems. The Army recently axed its battle management system without a replacement. There is a need for a unifying system that links the three services of the ADF for these missiles to be used effectively.

Finally, the government must be transparent with the Australian people about the need for this capability, its cost, and the progress in achieving the operational deployment of this system of missile systems. The potential threat posed by authoritarian regimes has again become clear with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While hardly a new lesson, there are regimes who will resort to military threats and war to achieve their desired objectives in the 21st century. The government needs to engage more widely and in more detail on the costs of deterring foreign aggression against Australia and our friends.

Much has been made of the pre-election nature of the announcements this week. This is certain to be part of the government’s calculus in the timing of these announcements. But that does not make them any less necessary.

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