This was published 10 months ago
Opinion
How Iran and the US could end up in a war neither of them really want
Amin Saikal
Professor of Middle Eastern, Central Asian and Islamic StudiesThe United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran have reached a tipping point in their long-standing hostility.
Following the killing of three American soldiers and wounding of many more in a drone attack on the US military base Tower 22 in Jordan, for which Washington has blamed the Iranian-backed Iraqi group Kata’ib Hezbollah, the US has begun a military campaign against this group and similar organisations in Iraq and Syria.
President Joe Biden’s choice of response is to degrade Iranian regional capability against the US and avoid a direct conflict with Iran. But the danger of this strategy, amid the spectre of the ongoing Gaza war, could easily further unravel the Middle East.
The US and Iran have been locked in a vicious cycle of animosity since the advent of the Iranian, predominantly Shia, Islamic regime 44 years ago. Following the toppling of the pro-Western monarchy of Mohammad Reza Shah in the revolution, the founder of the regime, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, condemned the US for its regionally “hegemonic” support of the Shah’s dictatorial rule and castigated Israel for its occupation of the Palestinian lands, especially Jerusalem – Islam’s third-holiest site. The takeover of the US embassy in Tehran by Khomeini’s militant supporters in 1979, where 52 of the embassy’s personnel were kept hostage for 444 days, and the US’s rejection of the Islamic regime as fundamentalist and an anomaly in world politics, diluted further relations and laid the foundations for a lasting enmity between the two sides.
The Islamic regime has feared a US, Israeli or combined attack, while America and its regional allies have long viewed the Republic as a major threat to their security interests in the region. Washington has pursued a policy of containment of the Republic and heavily sanctioned it, especially over its nuclear program on suspicion of its military aims. Tehran, in turn, has done whatever possible to safeguard its security.
Given the enormity of US and Israeli firepower, and the existence of many American military bases across the Persian Gulf, Iran has opted for a defence strategy of asymmetrical warfare. This strategy has involved not only strengthening the regime’s conventional military prowess, led by its vanguard Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), but also supporting a network of militant groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen to deter or combat effectively any outside attack. The regime holds its proxy forces as imperative for its security.
The regime has heavily invested in a variety of short, medium and long-range missiles as well as drones capable of hitting enemy targets within a 20,000-kilometre radius, and in advancing a nuclear program for “peaceful purposes”. Beyond this, it has forged close strategic cooperation ties with Russia and China.
Yet while the Islamic Republic and the US have often eyeballed one another, Iran and Israel have been immersed in a shadowy war for years, attacking each other’s assets mostly outside their territories.
Attempts by both sides at conciliation have failed. The most important came in 2015, when President Barack Obama and his Iranian counterpart, the reformist Hassan Rouhani signed the Iran nuclear agreement (also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA). But President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the deal in 2018 on the basis that Iran was the source of all evils in the region caused Tehran to enhance its uranium enrichment program which has now passed 60 per cent purity. While the US and Israel have pledged they will not allow Iran to produce nuclear bombs, Tehran has moved ever closer to the threshold. And though Biden initially sought a resolution of the nuclear dispute after taking office, ultimately his administration has been unable to come to terms with Tehran’s conditions.
Since Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel, and Israel’s massive response (which has seen the International Court of Justice consider the plausibility of genocidal actions by Israel), the regional picture has changed for the US and Iran.
Washington’s unshakeable support of Israel’s goals to eliminate Hamas and see a destruction of all threats from Iran and its affiliates, and Tehran’s resolve to protect its interests by activating its proxies in response, have brought the protagonists to a flashpoint. Though both the US and Iran have publicly said they don’t want direct confrontation, they have never been as close to it as they are now. An American retaliation against Iranian assets – even outside Iranian territory, including the Kata’ib Hezbollah – is bound to invite an Iranian response.
The US has the power to cause massive damage to Iranian assets, but Iran also possesses the necessary capability to target American bases and Israel directly or indirectly through its proxies, notably Hezbollah and the Houthis. The biggest danger for the region and the US now would be Hezbollah’s pounding of Israel, and Israel’s response if it finds itself cornered.
In an election year, Biden is facing pressure from his political opponents, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham in particular, to hit targets inside Iran, just as Israeli leaders have also urgently desired.
But such action could easily spark unprecedented instability across the region at enormous cost not only for the parties directly involved, but also the world economy. What’s more, with an election looming, there is no guarantee that those currently making calls in the White House will still be there by the end of the year. It is these facts also that have the power to potentially deter the two sides from igniting an all-out Middle East war and creating an unmanageable regional inferno.
Amin Saikal is emeritus professor of Middle Eastern studies at the Australian National University, an adjunct professor of social sciences at the University of Western Australia, and the author of Iran Rising: The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic.