Why Ukraine’s new strike strategy has Putin on the run

The best defence always features offensive operations. And while there has been a recent focus on Ukraine’s southern ground campaign, another Ukrainian offensive has accelerated.

Last week, Ukraine undertook a co-ordinated series of long-range strikes against targets across Russia and occupied Crimea. These attacks are evidence of evolving and increasingly sophisticated Ukrainian attacks deep into its enemy’s heartland.

A Ukrainian soldier loads a bomb on a drone near Bakhmut, the site of fierce battles with Russian forces in the Donetsk region on Sunday.Credit: AP

Extending the range of strike capabilities has been a key evolution for the Ukrainians since the beginning of the Russian invasion. While initially founded on ground-based rocket launchers, since late 2022 the armoury of strike weapons has been enhanced with armed drones, cruise missiles from the UK and France as well as uncrewed maritime strike vessels.

These strikes are a crucial element in degrading Russian military capability, including forcing the redeployment of air defence radars and other systems. At the same time, Ukraine’s burgeoning strategic strike campaign has political objectives. The strikes boost Ukrainian morale and shows Ukraine’s friends that it is serious about winning the war.

And they are designed to influence public opinion in Russia. As President Volodymyr Zelensky described after a recent drone attack on Moscow, “Gradually, the war is returning to the territory of Russia, to its symbolic centres and military bases, and this is an inevitable, natural and absolutely fair process.”

From mid-2022, Ukraine received long-range High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) rocket launchers. These were, and still are, employed to destroy critical Russian communications facilities, Russian Army headquarters, and crucial fuel and ammunition storage facilities.

Workers clean part of a damaged skyscraper in Moscow’s business district after a reported drone attack last month.Credit: AP

But this new weapon also forced Ukraine to develop its institutional capacity for long-range target identification, planning and battle damage assessment. This has underpinned more recent developments in its long-range strike capacity.

Importantly, when the HIMARS were introduced, they had a psychological effect on the Russians. More of the invading Russian force was under threat of attack from the longer-range rockets. The Russians had to quickly adapt and disperse their already tenuous logistics system. The Ukrainians observed this systemic physical and psychological disruption and wondered, “What if we could strike even further at bigger political and military targets?”

In late 2022 and 2023, Ukraine’s capability to attack the Russians was enhanced with long-range aerial and maritime weapons. To begin, the Ukrainians modified old Soviet-era Tu-141 Strizh surveillance drones. The Strizh were employed in long-range strikes on the Russian Engels and Dyagilevo air bases in December 2022.

In 2023, the provision of the UK-built Storm Shadow and French SCALP missiles, with their 250-kilometre range, extended the ability of Ukraine to strike strategic Russian targets and forced the Russians even further to disperse and defend their airfields and high-value headquarters and logistics facilities.

Last week, Zelensky announced that Ukraine had developed and deployed an indigenous long-range strike weapon. The weapon made its operational debut with a strike on an airport in western Russia. Sophisticated missiles like this have been complemented with simpler commercial drones, such as Australian cardboard drones. Military targets have been destroyed and damaged, and drones have forced multiple closures at Moscow airports. These attacks have avoided civilian casualties but have generated massive media attention. The strikes, contrary to the hand-wringing by Western politicians, have also not resulted in Russian escalation.

Ukraine has developed other methods to hit Russia. It has expanded into the maritime domain with the development of semi-submersible attack craft. In October 2022, the Ukrainians conducted a surprise attack on the Russian Black Sea fleet with multiple uncrewed surface vessels. A Russian frigate and a mine hunter were attacked by the Ukrainian weapons. Other attacks were conducted earlier this year, as well as strikes against a naval ship and a tanker in August.

The Ukrainian strategic strike campaign is part of a co-ordinated series of campaigns that, in totality, are placing increasing pressure on Russia. Three major Ukrainian ground campaigns are under way in the south, east and north-east. It is increasingly likely that Ukraine will make a significant breakthrough in at least one of these fronts. The ground campaigns are supported by a maritime, air defence and strategic influence campaigns. With winter approaching, and a likely slowdown in ground operations, strategic strikes will only grow in significance.

This capability has been developed, on a shoestring budget, in 18 months. By comparison, Australia’s intention to “hold adversary forces and infrastructure at risk further from Australia” was announced three years ago in the Defence Strategic Update. While there have been many media releases, Defence is yet to field a single new weapon. One wonders what the massively bureaucratised Australian Department of Defence might achieve towards our own strategic strike capability with just a small measure of the creativity, drive and leadership demonstrated by Ukraine. Given the absence of any mention of lessons from Ukraine in the recent Defence Strategic Review, we will probably never know.

Mick Ryan is a retired ADF major general. He is the author of War Transformed and an adjunct fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC.

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