As China prepares to invade Taiwan, a reality check: sitting on the sidelines won’t help us

Prime  Minister  Anthony Albanese’s second visit to China – pencilled in for this month – will come weeks before the People’s Liberation Army’s 98th  anniversary on August  1, 2025, a date laden with symbolism as Beijing approaches the military modernisation milestone of its centenary in 2027. Since 2021, US military and intelligence officials have warned that 2027 marks another key milestone: the date that Xi Jinping has instructed his military to have the capability to invade Taiwan.

It was a point reinforced by US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth at the Shangri-La defence conference in Singapore in June. And it is a warning the Australian  prime  minister will have in the back of his mind: China is both a critical economic partner and an escalating security threat. If the People’s Republic of China chooses to take Taiwan by force, it will not be a straightforward island invasion but one that is likely to lead to a wide-raging Indo-Pacific conflict with significant implications for Australia.

A missile is launched from an unspecified location in China in response to then US speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022.Credit: AP

Xi’s PRC views Taiwan as a “a sacred and inseparable part of China’s territory”. China’s PLA has become one of the planet’s most capable forces – with a growing nuclear arsenal, the world’s largest standing army and navy, and a sophisticated rocket force. This rapid growth in military strength, which some could equate with China’s growing economic and security weight globally as a superpower, has been coupled with a sharp deterioration in relations between Taiwan and the PRC. China has suspended official communications and restricted tourism.

China has also ramped up its military operations in and around Taiwan. Following then US speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, China launched its largest ever military exercises in the area, including ballistic missiles flying over Taiwan. These coercive demonstrations, paired with increasingly hostile rhetoric, have now become the norm.

Last year, China’s military published a simulated graphic of missiles hitting Taiwan. At the Shangri-La dialogue that same year, China’s current Defence Minister, Admiral Dong Jun, said Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party will be “nailed to the pillar of shame in history” and that “anyone who dares separate Taiwan from China will only end up in self-destruction”.

It is within this context that Hegseth, at the Shangri-La dialogue, referred to the threat from China as “imminent”. My recent trips to Taiwan indicate there is mixed sentiment in the security community as to the likelihood of a Chinese military invasion. In late 2023, then Democratic Progressive Party president Tsai Ing-wen said China’s current economic and political challenges would probably hold it back from attempting an invasion in the near term.

In May this year, however, Taiwan’s current president – while generally reticent to talk on the prospects of an invasion – compared Taiwan’s present plight with 1930s Europe. A September 2024 poll of 1200 Taiwanese people conducted by the country’s Institute for National Security and Defence Research showed that, while most saw China’s “territorial ambitions as a serious threat”, they did not think this was likely to manifest in an attack on Taiwan.

This view is perhaps understandable. Taiwan’s geography, shallow coastal waters, mountainous terrain and limited invasion windows due to weather make any military assault a monumental task. Such a challenge that the US abandoned plans to invade Taiwan during World War II under Operation Causeway.

However, despite the challenges, China is clearly preparing its military and economy for the possibility of invading Taiwan. Over the past year, it has stockpiled key resources – grain, oil, cobalt, copper and iron ore – and focused on enhancing amphibious capabilities, including barges with bridge-like structures suited to Taiwan’s shallow beaches. Amid intensified drills and sharper rhetoric, these preparations suggest invasion remains a real
possibility – and may be growing more plausible.

A major flaw in Australia’s Taiwan debate is the simplistic “will we or won’t we intervene?” framing, which assumes any conflict would be confined to Taiwan. In reality, an invasion would be far more complex. The Taiwan Strait’s geography, weather and Taiwan’s defences already make it a formidable task. That challenge is amplified by expected US and Japanese intervention from bases in Japan and the Philippines, forces China would try to neutralise pre-emptively.

Any invasion would almost certainly immediately trigger a broader regional conflict involving one of Australia’s key allies and at least two of its closest security partners. In a region-wide conflict, Australia’s national security interests would be jeopardised, and it would have little choice but to respond. Its key role would be defending Australia and its sea lines of communication.

Even without current US military rotations or Australia’s role as a strategic location for American operations, staying on the sidelines would be inconsistent with our national interests. Australia’s security, including maritime trade, would be directly threatened. Not to mention Australia’s obligations under the 1951 ANZUS Treaty.

It would also seriously damage Australia’s credibility with key security partners and regional neighbours. Moreover, if China resorts to force against Taiwan, it is unlikely to stop there. Beijing is also engaged in maritime and territorial disputes with South-East Asian states and South Korea and Japan. A successful invasion would embolden further aggression.

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would not be an isolated act – it would trigger a regional conflict with direct consequences for Australia’s security. An invasion may not be imminent or inevitable, but China’s clear preparations demand serious attention. Australia must invest in its own defence – not because war is certain, but because deterrence depends on capability. And if deterrence fails, we must be ready to defend our vital interests.

Jennifer Parker is a defence and national security expert associate at the ANU’s National Security College. She has served for more than 20 years as a warfare officer in the Royal Australian Navy.