The rise and rise of far-right populists: why democracies can’t be smug

Looking back at recent elections, you’d be tempted to say the last year was not a bad one at all for liberal democracy, or even that far-right populism might be in decline. That would be a shortsighted conclusion and a dangerous one.

For sure, 2022 was a mixed electoral year for the populist far-right, with some very high-profile losses. A sweeping victory of Trumpist candidates in the United States midterms didn’t come to pass; in France Marine Le Pen once again failed to defeat Emmanuel Macron; and Jair Bolsonaro lost the presidency of Brazil to Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.

A rising force: French far-right leader Marine Le Pen may have been defeated this time, but her vote is increasing and she plans to be back. Credit: AP

On the other side of the ledger, the populist far-right’s successes included Giorgia Meloni becoming Italy’s first far-right prime minister since the end of World War II; the Sweden Democrats overcoming their extremist past to be accepted as a partner by the country’s ruling coalition; and a new Israeli government with prominent far-right ministers.

Considering the respective sizes of these countries, you might think that liberal democracy is in credit. Here’s the problem: far-right populism’s successes in 2022 reflect continuing long-term structural changes, while its defeats reflect short-term wins for liberal democratic forces that are in deep trouble globally.

Let’s take a closer look at this set of results. In Italy and Sweden, Rubicons were crossed. While in previous decades the Italian governments of Silvio Berlusconi had featured far-right populist parties, these had always been junior coalition partners. Now the far-right is in the driving seat, with a prime minister and leading party whose roots are unambiguously in post-Fascist politics.

Ron DeSantis with Donald Trump ... the brand remains. Credit: AP

In Sweden, the parties of the centre-right had vowed for years that they would never do business with the Sweden Democrats, given the latter’s neo-Nazi past. However, eight years out of power eroded that principle and, after the Sweden Democrats finished second in September’s election, they were accepted as a supporting partner by the new right-wing government.

If events in Italy and Sweden look epoch-defining, the defeats for far-right populism in the United States and France do not. While Trump himself may be in decline, Trumpism is certainly not, with plenty of potential successors such as Florida governor Ron DeSantis ready to continue his political legacy. By contrast, it is hard to see a competitive Democratic candidate for 2024 beyond the now 80-year-old Joe Biden.

In France, Macron kept Le Pen at bay for a second time. But she is getting closer. Having received 34 per cent of the vote when she lost to him in 2017, she got 42 per cent in last April’s presidential election. Under French law, Macron cannot run next time, while Le Pen has indicated she will. She has a well organised and established party behind her. Macron’s Renaissance Party is a self-created personal vehicle that seems unlikely to produce a successor.

The last week of 2022 provided more examples of far-right populism’s long-term victories and short-term defeats. In Israel, the drift over many years of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud Party towards a full embrace of far-right politics seems completed with a new government that has strong ultra-nationalist and ultra-Orthodox voices.

It has now become entirely normal that some of the largest democracies can be governed by far-right populists.

In Brazil, Bolsonaro, like Trump, has flown to the populist retirement home of Florida after his 49-51 per cent defeat by Lula, but leaves behind a country in which far-right politics and sympathies with Brazil’s dictatorial past have been legitimised after decades in the political wilderness.

To understand the historical significance of these events, it’s worth taking a step back from the year-to-year view and remembering how the populist far-right was doing at the start of this century. While there had been sporadic successes that, like Pauline Hanson’s One Nation in this country, crashed and burned almost as quickly as they emerged, the populist far-right was largely politically irrelevant across Western democracies.

Even when it did well at the polls, it was toxic. If you’d been reading the news in early 2000, you’d have come across stories about how European Union member states were imposing sanctions on Austria because of the entry of the far-right Freedom Party as a junior partner in a coalition government. That reaction would be unthinkable now, not least since some of the continent’s biggest democracies, such as Italy, Poland and the increasingly authoritarian Hungary, have governments in which the populist far-right are the dominant forces.

Instead, two decades into the 21st century, liberal democrats find themselves in a situation where even narrow defeats of leaders such as Trump, Le Pen and Bolsonaro are treated as great victories rather than the red-light warnings they should be.

In contrast to 2000, it has now become entirely normal that some of the largest democracies, from India to the US, and from Italy to Brazil, can be governed by far-right populists.

This year is unlikely to bring much respite for liberal democrats. Elections in Poland will probably deliver a third consecutive government for the far-right populists of Law and Justice, further pushing that country towards a Hungarian-style “illiberal democracy”.

In Spain, until recently considered “immune” to such phenomena due to its not-so-distant fascist past, the far-right populist Vox is set to consolidate its position as the third party just four years after it entered parliament.

Irrespective of specific defeats and individual years that are slightly better or worse, the long-term trend is pretty clear: the 21st century continues to be the era of the rise of the populist far-right. Figuring out how to halt this in the long term, rather than rejoicing at short-term victories, remains the key challenge for liberal democrats worldwide.

Duncan McDonnell is Professor of Politics and Australian Research Council Future Fellow at Griffith University in Brisbane.

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