Academic freedom recognised but sacked scientist fails in bid to be reinstated

At first sight, the High Court’s decision yesterday to dismiss an appeal by university professor Peter Ridd was disappointing for advocates of intellectual freedom in universities.

Professor Ridd will no doubt be frustrated that the termination of his employment by James Cook University was, in effect, upheld. But on the fundamental underlying issue – the protection of academic freedom – the decision is greatly reassuring.

Professor Peter Ridd who has lost his appeal to the High Court.Credit: Alex Ellinghausen

Academic freedom is an ancient principle strongly protected in the great university systems of the world. The basic idea is that research and teaching flourish when researchers are allowed maximum freedom to pursue their research as they think best.

That is not to say that research is a free-for-all. On the contrary, research is disciplined by academic methods as well as ethical and other norms. But the basic point is that the quality of research and the correctness of claims made by researchers are matters for the academic community. In other words, it is for researchers to determine what is good research and not governments, university leaders or anyone else.

From this perspective, the history of the Ridd case was dispiriting. Ridd was sanctioned and eventually terminated for criticisms he made of colleagues during scientific dispute about the effect of climate change on the Great Barrier Reef, a matter on which he holds unorthodox views. The dispute was highly personal and unpleasant, but it was, at bottom, a dispute between scientists about science.

Ridd was sacked for criticising colleagues during a scientific dispute about the effect of climate change on the Great Barrier Reef.Credit: Jason South

The decision of the Full Federal Court (from which Ridd appealed to the High Court) was particularly dispiriting. That Court had decided that the principles of academic freedom - which it thought to be unhelpfully vague - were not relevant to the rights and wrong of this dispute. Even more worryingly, Ridd was found to have violated an obligation in his university’s Code of Conduct to treat others with ‘honesty, respect and courtesy’, a requirement at odds with the central principles of academic freedom.

The last point is very important. Many workplaces make such demands of their staff. But in universities they are dangerous, at least if applied to academic discourse. Academic freedom requires that researchers should be free to disagree with each other vigorously and even in ways that would be disrespectful in other contexts and academics will often unsettle and even offend their colleagues.

It may be necessary to point out that another academic’s research is fundamentally misconceived, sloppy, disingenuous or even fraudulent. There are obvious limits to scholarly discourse, including bullying, harassment and defamation, but objective (and responsibility) of universities to advance knowledge demands an openness to challenge that goes beyond that of an ordinary workplace.

The High Court’s decision yesterday is a full-throated defence of these ideas. In a unanimous decision, the Court explicitly recognises the relevance of academic freedom to the dispute and concludes, relying upon legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, that “academic freedom must permit expression that departs from norms of civility required elsewhere”.

In light of these ringing statements, why did Professor Ridd’s case fail? The answer is complex but, in short, Ridd was sanctioned not only for his disrespect of colleagues but also for violating confidentiality obligations applicable to the disciplinary proceedings against him. These obligations, the Court held, did not limit his academic freedom.

Some might detect a sting in the tail of the decision: it is not hard to imagine that confidentiality requirements could be used oppressively to suppress legitimate criticism of a university. But there are exceptions to these requirements that the Court notes (and on which Ridd did not rely). It also seems strange that Ridd’s censure under the confidentiality provisions should stand even though the complaint giving rise to them failed, but again this is a matter which Ridd did not exploit. There is a strong suggestion in the judgment that if the case had been differently argued, the result might also have been different.

Universities are an extraordinary resource on which successful societies rely for their capacity to improve lives, advance knowledge and support democracy. It is vital that we maintain the conditions that will allow them to continue their remarkable contribution to human flourishing. Just as importantly, at a time when misinformation abounds and public trust in so many institutions is declining, the society that is asked to fund them should know that their scholarly processes are up to the challenge. In the respect, the Ridd decision secures an essential foundation for Australia’s future.

Adrienne Stone is Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor at Melbourne Law School and currently holds and Australian Laureate Fellowship.