License to kill: an insight into the job of Australia’s police snipers
SOME of Australia’s top snipers have provided a rare insight into their jobs and revealed what it’s like to have a license to kill.
THEY are popular Hollywood characters with a license to kill but what’s it really like to be a professional sniper?
The inquest into the deaths arising from the Lindt Café siege this week heard a rare insight into the job of Australia’s police snipers as two of those positioned in the best vantage points during the stand-off gave evidence.
Sydney siege gunman Man Haron Monis executed cafe manager Tori Johnson at 2.13am on December 16, 2014, prompting police to storm the cafe and bring the bloody 17 hour ordeal to an end. Barrister Katrina Dawson also died after she was hit by seven fragments of a police bullet in the crossfire.
There has been much public discussion as to why teams of snipers deployed to three locations around Martin Place didn’t shoot Monis dead before hostage lives were lost.
For the first time, two of the snipers who were positioned on level one of the Westpac building from 10.30am and 2pm on the day of the siege, have revealed what went on inside their vantage point from the moment they arrived until the end.
Their role during the siege was to provide commentary and photos of their observations to police command and kill the hostage taker if he posed an “immediate threat” to hostages.
Two of the snipers, codenamed Sierra 3-1 and Sierra 3-3, told the inquest how they picked their locations, marked their targets for each cafe window, stared through their riflescopes for hours, planned to hit the gunman’s “brain stem” and finally watched a hostage get executed.
The snipers said that prior to Mr Johnson’s death they simply didn’t consider the gunman to be posing an “immediate threat” — which meant they were not legally justified in taking a shot at him when they had an opportunity to fire around 7.30pm. Just after 2am, they watched through ‘white window 2’ as Mr Johnson got down on his knees with his hands above his head and his fingers interlocked. The gunman was out of their sights when they saw Mr Johnson shot dead at point blank range.
Sierra 3-1 and 3-3 maintained their decision to hold fire on the target when he became partly visible through a window almost five hours earlier was the best thing to do at the time.
According to the snipers, the decision to kill or not to kill isn’t one Australia’s top marksmen make lightly.
PICKING A LOCATION
It was the morning of the Lindt Café siege when police snipers were called into work. After picking up his equipment, including a Remington 700 bolt-action rifle and 7.62mm glass-piercing ammunition, Sierra 3-3 strolled down King St, Macquarie St and Martin Place to scour for the best location to set up in for the day.
The Westpac building in Martin Place offered a view into the cafe from a “high position”. It had tinted windows which would conceal the snipers from the gunman’s view and was in “close proximity to see within the stronghold”. It was a suitable place to execute a “firing solution” if required. The Sierra 3 team — comprised of Sierra 3-1, 3-2 and 3-3 — moved into position on level one of the Westpac building from around 10.30am as other snipers were deployed to the Channel 7 and RBA buildings.
Sierra 3-3 took on the role of main shooter. He had “the best overall coverage” of the Lindt Café and was probably the best shot. Sierra 3-2 was ‘breacher’. It would be his job to shoot a “tennis size ball” hole through the glass of the Westpac window for Sierra 3-3 to simultaneously fire through and strike the target. Sierra 3-1, the most senior and experienced of the team, was tasked with shooting through the glass of the Westpac building and the Lindt Café building if necessary but without a breacher.
The Sierra 3 team was not confident the bullets would still be in tact after penetrating the Lindt Cafe’s thick glass but each member was prepared to fire if they deemed it necessary, the inquest heard.
Tactical Operations Unit sergeant Sierra 3-1 was also the snipers’ co-ordinator. It was up to Sierra 3-1 to broadcast his observations of hostages and the gunman to police command and upload information into the police log on an ipad throughout the day.
The snipers set up their rifles on tripods and marked the pen dot target for each window of the Lindt Café.
“I didn’t have anyone to breach the window for me. If there was an immediate threat … I was pushing my muzzle right up to the glass … I was just going to fire in that fashion,” Sierra 3-1 said.
They stayed in position all day, only moving away for toilet breaks, and when going deeper into the room briefly when the sun obstructed their view.
In daylight, the snipers could see about 3-6m into the Lindt Café windows.
“That’s excluding shadows cast at the rear of the building to the ‘black’ side,” Sierra 3-3 told the inquest.
At night, they could see between 2-5m into the cafe through the windows.
“Anything beyond that was pretty hazy,” he said.
Throughout the siege they saw hostages moving around and relayed their observations and photos back to police command. But Monis was rarely in sight, according to Sierra 3-1 and 3-3.
THE PERFECT SHOT
Sierra 3-3 told the inquest how the plan was for Sierra 3-2 to fire a breach shot to form a “tennis ball sized” hole in the glass of the Westpac window so he could immediately follow through with a shot at the target if the opportunity arose.
Sierra 3-1 explained that a perfect shot would penetrate the target’s brain stem and ensure he couldn’t respond by pulling a trigger or pushing a button to detonate a bomb.
“(Shooting a round into a person’s brain stem) yields that person to fall in a heap. There’s no neural activity that can occur, (they can’t) push a button (or) pull a trigger. They literally just drop,” he said.
“If we just wound the target at the time we intend to kill the target it can have catastrophic consequences … everybody inside (could end up) dead.”
MAKING THE DECISION TO KILL
The snipers finally had Monis in their sights for 10 minutes at around 7.35pm.
“He was stationary … You could see a small portion of what I believed to be his head, from the cheek upwards. I could see the black headband which is what made me think it was him. There was a hostage in there holding up an apron, or something, obscuring most of that window,” Sierra 3-3 said.
“I relayed that, ‘I think that’s him’, and (that was) relayed … over the radio. The discussion (between snipers) was ‘we think that’s him because of the headband, it looks like him from the photos that we’ve seen’.”
The head sniper said he could see the gunman wearing “ a black bandana with white Arabic script across it”. “It was folded down … and positioned across his forehead. It was a shaved head, bald and shiny, tanned skin,” he said. A concern from police command that one of the hostages could have been wearing Monis’ headband as a decoy was relayed to the snipers. If they were ever going to fire a shot with the aim of killing someone, the snipers needed to first be “100 per cent confident” they had their rifles aimed at the right target.
It had been about eight hours since the terrorist, proclaiming to be a member of ISIS, had first taken 18 people hostage.
Sierra 3-3 said he was not confident he could hit the target without risk to the remaining hostages, some of whom could be seen through the same window as Monis. Several hostages had escaped and the stronghold was relatively calm at that point. Sierra 3-3 said it was for those two reasons he ultimately didn’t fire in that moment.
“At the end of the day it wasn’t an option both for justification reasons and ... not knowing what was behind him,” he told the inquest.
The head sniper told the inquest he sought “intelligence reports” to satisfy himself that the hostages were under an immediate threat and he could take the shot.
There was no sign they were in immediate danger so legally he could not shoot Monis, he said.
“If the legal justification had been there was a shot that you would have attempted?” he was asked by Gabrielle Bashir SC, counsel for the family of slain cafe manager Tori Johnson.
“Yes,” Sierra 3-1 said.
For snipers, every decision they make could be the difference between life and death for innocent people caught up in hostage or other high risk situations. The responsibility of any shots fired by them, is theirs alone.
For that reason, the decision to pull the trigger ultimately comes down to each individual sniper. Sierra 3-1 said the marksmen “don’t need permission from anyone to fire”.
“Intelligence can be shared among ourselves to satisfy each other of an immediate threat,” Sierra 3-1 said.
“But (each sniper’s) decision to use (their) firearm rests with (them).
“So I can’t tell anyone else and they can’t tell me to pull the trigger.”
Sierra 3-3 said the marksmen had a plan in place for if it was deemed necessary they had to act immediately.
“The discussion was it’s not an ideal situation we’re in given all those considerations we have to take in to (fire) the shot. However if there is imminent or life threatening situations occurring we would attempt to act. As acting is better than doing nothing,” he said.
But according to Sierra 3-3, the opportunity to act simply didn’t arise.
Counsel assisting Sophie Callan: “With everything taken into account, did you form a view on the night of the viability of taking a shot?”
Sierra 3-3: “It wasn’t great. Having two mediums of glass to get through (it was a) potential hazard that would cause if the shot was missed, the risk to those inside. All of those things greatly reduced our confidence.”
“I would have to be satisfied I would be justified in taking a shot. That would be if there was imminent threat to a member of the public … hostages. I only act on my own assessment … I’m no more justified in firing my firearm than a general duties officer on the street.”
Sierra 3-3 said if they fired at the target and missed it would have compromised the snipers’ position and intentions.
“I’m not sure what that would do within the stronghold, how (the gunman) would react to that,” he said.
“Potentially it would (have been) catastrophic.”
A TRAGIC END
Around 2am, Monis’ had become increasingly agitated and the risk level had skyrocketed.
It was at this time the snipers noticed some of the hostages being moved from one side of the cafe to another.
“We would have broadcast about that I just don’t have a specific recollection of that ... (it was) certainly (significant). It was a change of the positioning of hostages in the premises,” Sierra 3-1 said.
“We were intently focused and trying to broadcast as much as possible over the radio.”
Suddenly, six hostages within clear view of the snipers, bolted from the cafe.
Monis fired his first shots toward them as they fled the building at 2.03am. The snipers saw the muzzle flash and heard the shots. But Monis was still nowhere to be seen.
Moments later, looking through their riflescopes, the Sierra 3 team saw Mr Johnson go “from a standing position to a kneeling position”.
At the time Monis was behind a wall between windows and not in view.
“I saw Tori take up a kneeling position in close proximity of window two,” Sierra 3-1 said.
“He was facing towards the main door so I could see his left side.
“(Mr Johnson) had his both hands interlocked on top of his head.
“We thought it was peculiar.”
The Sierra 3 team “discussed” their observations but were unable to fully assess the situation with Monis out of their sights.
Sierra 3-1 told the inquest he thought Monis had ordered Mr Johnson to his knees to prevent him from escaping.
“If I saw in a window in a sniper position where a hostage was about to die I would do what I could to stop it if I had a shot option,” he said
At 2.09am Monis fired another shot into the ceiling but failed to hit any hostages.
“I remember hearing a shot fired and seeing a muzzle flash and seeing Tori flinch,” Sierra 3-1 said.
“And by flinch I mean drop down momentarily from his position. But he resumed the position after that.”
“I couldn’t determine …(if) the treat had escalated … I couldn’t determine if (the shot) was at (Tori) or someone else. Or (if Monis) fired into the ceiling and it was at no one else. Generally the guidelines for triggers (to shoot) are immediate threat of death or serious injury to hostages.
“I don’t accept at that point he was in immediate danger.”
The snipers did not have enough information to determine that there was an immediate threat and therefore could not “legally justify” a firing solution, they said.
Mr Johnson had been on his knees for about seven minutes when Monis
shot him dead at point blank range, at 2.13am.
“I saw what I thought was a muzzle flash. And then I saw Johnson fall
forward,” Sierra 3-3 said.
“I couldn’t see him after that.
“I said ‘white window 2, hostage down’. I said that twice and again I
heard that being broadcast over the radio.”
Sierra 3-1 immediately called in their observations over police radio.
“Despite my two attempts of broadcasting during which I said ‘hostage
down in white window two’ no acknowledgment came my way in regards to
that event either,” he said.
But the message had been received by police command loud and clear and an emergency action plan was activated.
Tactical Operations Unit officers burst into the cafe and opened fire. Monis was dead within two minutes of executing Mr Johnson.
The snipers packed up their equipment and left the Westpac building in the dark of the night, full ammunition in tow.
