Why latest clash between nuclear rivals could blow up into something far more dangerous

Two weeks after a deadly terror attack in the disputed Kashmir region, India has fired missiles into Pakistan. The Indian government claims that it carried out nine “precision strikes at terrorist camps” in Kashmir as part of “Operation Sindoor”. Pakistan claims to have shot down several Indian jets and is threatening imminent retaliation. At least 34 people have been killed.

The escalation of tensions is unsurprising. As soon as the April 22 terror attack took place, Indian officials deemed Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba culpable and accused the country’s authorities of complicity.

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif angrily rejected these accusations and urged the US to steer India towards a course of de-escalation. These recommendations were not heeded by New Delhi.

Now that India and Pakistan are on an escalation course, the big question is what comes next. If you’re an optimist, history suggests that a swift de-escalation could be on the cards.

The 1999 Kargil War provides a precedent for this scenario. In May of that year, Pakistani troops disguised as Kashmiri militants launched incursions into India’s side of the Line of Control. After more than 1000 casualties on both sides, India recaptured Kargil in June. The war was followed by numerous tit-for-tat attacks in the years that followed. Nevertheless, these escalations did not trigger a major war between the nuclear-armed powers in South Asia.

Despite these sanguine historical precedents, there are reasons to believe that this conflict is more dangerous.

The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty institutionalised water resource sharing from the Indus region’s six major rivers and has served as a crisis-proof agent of de-escalation. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s pausing of this treaty after the April 22 attack removed this guardrail.

Although India lacks the dam and reservoir infrastructure to store large amounts of additional water, Modi appears to be determined to cut off Pakistan’s access to water resources from the Indus River region. This resolve is interpreted in Islamabad as a non-negotiable act of war.

Domestic politics in Pakistan and India also favours conflict. Since the ousting of then-prime minister Imran Khan in April 2022, Pakistan has faced riots and uneven civil-military relations. As the de-escalation of the Kargil War paved the way for then-leader Nawaz Sharif’s exit and General Pervez Musharraf’s coup d’etat, Pakistan’s leadership might be hesitant to swiftly sue for peace.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the White House in February.Credit: AP

Meanwhile, Modi’s frequent painting of the rival Congress Party as soft on Pakistan and linkage of anti-Pakistan rhetoric to his populist appeal adds another domestic layer of escalation.

The simultaneous escalation of US-China tensions also adds complication to the India-Pakistan conflict.

Due to the 3000-kilometre China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which was inaugurated in 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping views Pakistan as a core strategic partner.

Under Trump’s leadership, the United States has weathered a tariff war with India and pursued closer relations with New Delhi. While neither the US nor China benefits from open war in South Asia, these polarisations could prevent them from supporting de-escalation in a unified manner.

Over the past three years, the world has watched with bated breath as Russia threatened nuclear Armageddon against Ukraine and the West. The incipient India-Pakistan conflict takes the risk of an apocalyptic clash between nuclear powers to new heights.

The Telegraph, London

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