Opinion
South Korea’s Jeju Air crash: The most pressing questions facing investigators
Richard de Crespigny
Former Qantas pilotTen years after Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 disappeared, when people ask me what happened, my answer remains: “I don’t know, and it’s a sign of strength to admit you don’t know.” Assumptions and speculation create unrealistic expectations and needless anguish. A single, accurate data point can dismantle the most elaborate theories, underscoring the importance of patience and evidence.
So it is with Jeju Air Flight 2216, which tragically crashed in South Korea on Sunday, claiming 179 lives. I do not know what happened inside the aircraft.
Only two flight attendants, seated at the rear of the Boeing 737-800, survived. These seats are the safest in a head-on crash, which is why we can expect the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, located at the back of the aircraft, to be intact and reveal facts about what happened during this crisis.
I was piloting Qantas Flight 32 in 2010 when an engine failed soon after take-off from Singapore. We landed safely with none of the 469 passengers and crew injured. However, the world immediately erupted with misinformation, flawed analysis and false deductions. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau made the courageous decision to publish the facts immediately, quelling conspiracy theories and inaccurate deductions. While the US National Transportation Safety Board initially criticised this approach, it eventually adopted a similar strategy following the Asiana Airlines Flight 214 crash in San Francisco, which killed three and injured about 200 people. Transparency builds teamwork and trust, and enables constructive learning from tragedy.
I expect the investigators in the Jeju Air tragedy to answer the following questions:
Was there a bird strike? Videos show a right engine event. If a bird strike occurred, to what extent was that engine and its associated systems compromised?
Why did the transponder fail? The aircraft’s ADS-B transponder, which broadcasts data including location, speed, and altitude twice per second, ceased transmissions shortly after the engine event. What caused this failure?
Why were the landing gear and flaps not deployed? The aircraft turned northward before attempting a reciprocal approach to land. However, it landed with both the landing gear and flaps up. Did the ground proximity warning system issue the “too low gear” warning?
Why did the aircraft touch down so late along the runway? It touched down in the latter half of the 2900-metre runway, leaving insufficient distance to stop. I think this approach suggests the pilot may have assumed the landing gear to be down. However, the landing gear was up, and so the aircraft “floated”, decelerating slowly in what’s called “ground-effect”, which acts like a cushion close to the ground and led to a late touchdown.
Did the pilots attempt to take off again before reaching the end of the runway? Videos show the left engine airborne before the runway’s end. Perhaps they did attempt to take off.
Fear Response? Were the pilots affected by the fear response – fight, flight or freeze? The amygdala in our brain triggers this response within 20 milliseconds of sensing threats, releasing adrenaline and cortisol, which supercharge our cells, increase our breathing and heart rates, and tense our muscles to be ready to fight – all of which impair precise actions.
To avoid the disastrous effects of the fear response, pilots are trained to “aviate, navigate, communicate”. This is critical in the first 30 seconds. Aviate – fly the aircraft (and keep it in the air), stay alive. Navigate – find a safe place in the air to consider your next steps. Then communicate – tell others the situation, your plans and requirements. Those actions keep you safe from the fear response while waiting those 30 seconds for the brain’s cortex (with its habits, intuitions and reasoning) to slowly come online.
Did the pilots hear critical warnings? The human brain monitors 4 million senses using just 20 watts of power. It runs five times faster than the latest Nvidia Blackwell processor using just 1 per cent of the chip’s power. It achieves this monumental feat by load-shedding unnecessary senses.
The brain sheds non-essential sensory input when overloaded, with sound being the first to shed. Why is this important? Did the pilots fail to hear and respond to the “too low gear” warning or other ground proximity warning system alerts?
Was the cockpit crew an effective team? Team dynamics play a crucial role in aviation safety. No individual is infallible – mistakes are part of the human condition. This is why effective teams have pilots accomplishing their tasks while monitoring the tasks of others. It is essential that all pilots have the responsibility, authority and psychological safety to challenge one another, regardless of rank.
In cultures with high “power distance” – a measure of hierarchical deference identified by Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede – subordinates may hesitate to correct their superiors. This dynamic contributed to accidents such as Korean Air Flight 801 (1997) and Asiana Airlines Flight 214 (2013). Did a similar dynamic affect Jeju Air Flight 2216?
The aircraft exploded when it crashed into a concrete barrier beyond the end of the runway. Was that barrier necessary? The 2900-metre runway at Muan airport is long enough for continuous 737 operations. The instrument landing system localiser radio transmitters sit atop a high concrete-earth mound, 290 metres after the end of the runway. While it is not ideal to have a hard antenna structure, this is clear of the 240-metre runway safety area required by the International Civil Aviation Organisation’s runway specifications.
Were proper procedures followed? Did the crew adhere to established procedures, and were those procedures fit for purpose?
Learning from tragedy: We will have to wait for the investigative authorities to release facts before drawing conclusions about this heartbreaking event. Until then, speculation serves no one. Instead, we must focus on asking the right questions, identify all contributing factors and then learning and adjusting from the findings, so that this type of disaster never happens again.
Boeing 737-800: This is a safe and successful aircraft. More than 7100 have been built since 1996, for commercial aviation (until 2020) and still for the military today. The 737-800 has no links connecting it to the problems besetting the newer 737 Max derivatives.
Aviation remains the safest form of transport: Aviation is the safest form of transportation. Not a single person died in a commercial jet accident in 2023. And no one goes to work intending to have an accident. We will learn from Jeju Air Flight 2216, identifying all contributing factors, and implement changes to prevent a recurrence. This relentless pursuit of continuous improvement is why flying remains the safest way to travel.
Captain Richard Champion de Crespigny was an A380 captain and the pilot in command of Qantas flight QF32 that suffered an engine failure over Singapore on November 4, 2010. He is the author of two books, QF32 and FLY! – The Elements of Resilience.
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