By Ian Parmeter
Hamas: The Quest for Power
Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell
Polity Press, $36.95
The back cover of this timely book has a quote from a British reviewer: “If there is one book to read on Hamas, this is it.” For once, the blurb says it all. The authors are two of the world’s foremost experts on the Hamas phenomenon. Beverley Milton-Edwards is a Senior Fellow at the Qatar-based Middle East Council on Global Affairs. Her connection with Qatar is important, given Qatar’s role as mediator in many conflicts within and beyond the Middle East – particularly now in the Gaza war, which had its first anniversary on October 7.
Stephen Farrell’s lengthy career as a journalist includes Jerusalem bureau chief for The Times (London) and foreign correspondent with The New York Times. Apart from his knowledge of the region, his skills as a journalist have undoubtedly helped make the book’s prose highly readable.
Their new book builds on their 2010 study, Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement. It takes the Hamas narrative to early this year, so includes the horrific attack a year ago, the Israeli reaction at the level of the Netanyahu government and at popular level, as well as among Arab states.
The authors have done the hard yards. The book is based on extensive interviews with Hamas representatives, other Palestinians and Israelis – all detailed in 38 pages of end notes. Their analysis is neutral, neither pro- nor anti-Hamas. They make the point in their preface that “to study is not to support”. Their purpose is to understand the movement and to explain it to the reader.
A woman holds an Israeli flag with red paint on it to resemble blood as protesters block a main road during a rally calling for a hostages deal on September 13, 2024 in Tel Aviv, Israel.Credit: Getty Images
The book opens with the surprise attack, but sensibly does not dwell overmuch on the details, which are now very well known. The more important questions are: why was the attack launched when it was, and what has it achieved? – particularly as the Hamas leadership would have been under no illusions about the ferocity of Israel’s response.
The authors quote Hamas’ then-leader, Ismail Haniyeh (subsequently assassinated in Tehran in a presumed Israeli operation), as publicly rationalising the attack in terms of retribution for Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip, its “colonisation” of the West Bank by settling half a million Israelis there in contravention of international law, and its permitting of Israelis to pray, and thus “sow corruption”, at the Al Aqsa Mosque, the third-holiest site in Islam – hence the name Hamas gave to the attack, “Al Aqsa Flood”.
But the authors note that Haniyeh singled out for particular criticism the Arab governments that signed “normalisation” deals with Israel in 2020 (the Abraham Accords) – the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan – joining Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994). They point out that the Hamas leadership would have been especially worried at reports that the major Arab state, Saudi Arabia, was in talks with the Biden administration to follow suit.
The fear Palestinians have had since former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem in 1977, that the Palestinian nationalist cause would be forgotten by the Arab world in its rush to make separate peace agreements with Israel, seemed about to be realised. Indeed, long-serving Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu had made clear that he would not address a Palestinian settlement until the normalisation process with the major Arab states had been completed. Hamas’ October 7 attack has managed to delay that process by years.
The authors set out the history of Hamas since its foundation in the early days of the first Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in 1987 until early this year. This is essential to an understanding of Hamas’ blend of nationalism, religion and charitable support, which has enabled it to become embedded in Palestinian society ideologically. Though its military capacity has been degraded by Israel’s onslaught on Gaza over the past year, Hamas is still far from being eliminated as a force in Palestinian society.
“Hamas has operated on a working assumption that when Israel and Palestine burn, its support grows,” they write. That’s evidenced by polling of Palestinians published by the Israeli newspaper The Times of Israel in June this year, which showed support for Hamas rising across the Occupied Territories (including, surprisingly, in Gaza) – and double that of its secular rival, Fatah.
The authors point out that though it’s an article of faith in Israel that Hamas is dedicated to the end of the Jewish state, that is “to mistake a milestone for a destination”. For Hamas “the removal of the Zionist state is a necessary condition to achieve its ultimate goal – a Palestinian state governed in accordance with Islam”. Fatah is also a threat to Hamas’ mission because it competes with Hamas for “hearts, minds and souls of Palestinians”.
The authors show how Israeli mistakes have contributed to Hamas’ rise. Though Netanyahu vehemently denies them, several Israeli news outlets have reported his remarks in March 2019 to a Likud party meeting showing that he supported Qatar funding Hamas in order to keep the Palestinian movement divided and thus ward off international pressure to create a Palestinian state.
This book is of particular value to the Middle East specialist because of the range of new information provided by the authors’ interviews. At the same time it’s fully accessible to the informed general reader. The narrative’s cut-off timing for publication was before Israel extended the war to its northern border to attack Hezbollah in Lebanon. The authors’ views on the impact of that war on Gaza would obviously have been of interest.
The book’s conclusion examines the two primary unanswered questions about the Gaza war: Netanyahu’s plan for the day after the fighting stops; and where Hamas will go from here.
The former question may not have an answer because Netanyahu’s style of government is largely reactive to events rather than shaping them. Much will depend on whether he remains in power if he is forced to an early election – though the success so far of his Lebanon campaign, particularly the targeted killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, has boosted his electoral standing substantially.
Hamas’ post-war future is even more opaque. The authors are clear in their judgment that Netanyahu’s primary war aim of destroying Hamas is unlikely to be fulfilled. But they quote with obvious approval an assessment by Palestinian academic Ali Jarbawi, of Birzeit University in the West Bank.
Jarbawi rules out the possibility that Hamas will be able to continue ruling Gaza by itself in the face of major international as well as Israeli opposition. In practical terms reconstruction funds are not going to flow to Gaza if Hamas is in sole control. He thinks Hamas realises that, but it will be determined to retain sufficient power, including military capability, to block actions by any alternative government that conflict with Hamas’ wishes. A sobering judgment.
The book is well presented. As well as the excellent notes, it has maps setting out locations mentioned in the narrative, photographs that bring the story to life, and a detailed timeline. An index would be useful – that might be rectified in future editions of the book.
But as it stands, the book provides a clear and accessible account of an organisation that Israel and the world will almost certainly have to deal with for years to come.
Ian Parmeter is a research scholar at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National University.
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